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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE NATURE OF THE UNION
Bradford R. Clark∗
Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes
no sense. These theories regard the Amendment as either underinclusive, overinclusive,
or an incoherent compromise because it prohibits federal courts from hearing “any suit”
against a state by out-of-state citizens, but does not prohibit suits against a state by its
own citizens. Two of these theories would either expand or contract the immunity
conferred by the text of the Amendment in order to avoid this absurd or anomalous
result. This Article suggests that the Eleventh Amendment made sense as written when
understood in its full historical context. In particular, the Articles of Confederation
empowered Congress to require states to supply men, money, and supplies, but gave
Congress no power to enforce its own commands. Prominent Founders initially argued
that the only way to fix the Articles was to give Congress coercive power over states.
But the Convention and the ratifiers ultimately rejected this idea because they feared
that the introduction of such power would lead to a civil war.
To avoid this danger, the Founders designed the Constitution to give Congress legislative
power over individuals rather than states. This novel approach eliminated the need for
coercive power over states, and provided Federalists with a key argument for adopting
the Constitution rather than amending the Articles. Antifederalists threatened to
undermine this case for the Constitution by arguing that the state-citizen diversity
provisions of Article III — authorizing suits “between” states and out-of-state citizens
— could be construed to permit suits against states (and thus imply federal power to
enforce any resulting judgments against states). Although Federalists denied this
construction, the Supreme Court proceeded to read Article III to permit out-of-state
citizens to sue states. Federalists and Antifederalists quickly joined forces to restore
their preferred construction of Article III. In adopting the Eleventh Amendment, they
saw no anomaly in prohibiting “any suit” against a state by out-of-state citizens because
they did not understand the Constitution to authorize any suits against states by in-state
citizens. Federal question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize such suits, and the
Founders likely would not have perceived any real need for such jurisdiction given their
understanding that the Constitution conferred neither legislative nor coercive power over
states. Because the Eleventh Amendment, as written, made sense in light of the nature
of the Union, the absurdity doctrine cannot justify departing from the terms of the
Amendment.
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∗

William Cranch Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law
School. For insightful comments, I thank A.J. Bellia, Curtis Bradley, Evan Caminker, Andy
Coan, Dick Fallon, Philip Hamburger, Joan Larsen, John Manning, Maeva Marcus, Jon Molot,
Henry Monaghan, Jim Pfander, Jeff Powell, Gil Seinfeld, Jon Siegel, Jeff Sutton, Ed Swaine,
Amanda Tyler, Carlos Vázquez, and workshop participants at the George Washington, Michigan,
Northwestern, and Notre Dame Law Schools. I also thank Jonathan Bond, John Kammerer, Jason Karasik, Max Kosman, Brittany Lewis-Roberts, Ryan Watson, Brian Wesoloski, and William
Zapf for excellent research assistance.

1818

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688564

2010]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1819

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.1
I. INTRODUCTION

L

eading theories of the Eleventh Amendment place surprisingly little emphasis on the words of the Amendment. In fact, according
to one prominent observer, “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is universally
taken not to mean what it says.”2 The reason is that most courts and
commentators regard the Amendment as either grossly under- or overinclusive. In their view, the best way to understand and apply the
Amendment is to look past its terms to its underlying purpose (as they
define it). Modern theorists feel justified in expanding or contracting
the immunity conferred by the text because they believe that following
the Amendment as written would produce the anomalous — or even
absurd — result of barring out-of-state citizens from suing states in
federal court while leaving in-state citizens free to do so. As a result,
leading theories of the Amendment tend to focus on why the Amendment cannot mean what it says.
This Article offers a novel account of why the Eleventh Amendment made sense at the time it was adopted and simultaneously provides insight into the Founders’ understanding of the nature of the
Union. The Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to exercise
legislative power over states rather than individuals, but provided no
means of enforcement. The Founders concluded that the Articles
could be made effective only by authorizing Congress to employ coercive military force against states who refused to comply with its affirmative commands. The Founders rejected proposals to introduce
coercive force, however, because they feared that the use of such power would lead to a civil war. They abandoned the Articles in favor of
a Constitution specifically designed to authorize Congress to exercise
legislative power solely over individuals rather than states. This approach obviated the need for the introduction of coercive power over
states. To be sure, the Constitution imposed important negative prohibitions on states, but these provisions could be enforced in suits between individuals or as federal defenses to enforcement actions
brought by states. Thus, enforcing these prohibitions did not necessitate either suits by individuals against states or the use of coercive
power against states.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1
2

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977).
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This background helps to make sense of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Amendment was adopted to overturn a construction of Article III
that permitted out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court, resulting in judgments that implied federal coercive power of the very kind
the Constitution was designed to avoid. During ratification, Antifederalists had warned that the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article
III could be construed to permit such suits. The Amendment did not
attempt to bar in-state citizens from suing their own states because no
one had suggested that Article III would permit such suits. Moreover,
if the Founders were correct in assuming that the Constitution neither
imposed nor permitted Congress to impose affirmative obligations on
states, then there would never be any suits against states to enforce
such obligations. On this understanding, the Amendment’s ban on all
suits by out-of-state citizens was a complete solution to the problem of
suits by individuals against states, and thus created no anomaly.
Current theories of the Eleventh Amendment — the immunity
theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise theory — all presuppose that the Amendment was poorly drafted and would produce
anomalous or absurd results if applied as written. The traditional
“immunity” theory, currently embraced by a majority of the Supreme
Court (but few academics), argues that states enjoy broad constitutional sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the Amendment. Proponents of broad immunity regard the Amendment’s text as unacceptably underinclusive because it bars suits only by out-of-state citizens.
In Hans v. Louisiana,3 the Court famously characterized a citizen’s
suggestion that “[t]he letter” of the Amendment left him free to sue his
own state as “an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a
construction never imagined or dreamed of.”4 In the Court’s view, the
purpose of the Amendment was to bar all suits by individuals against
states. According to the Court, the supposition that the states would
have adopted an amendment permitting their own citizens to sue them
in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States “is
almost an absurdity on its face.”5
By contrast, the more recent “diversity” theory, endorsed by a minority of the Court (but many academics), regards the text of the Eleventh Amendment as unacceptably overinclusive.6 Diversity theorists
insist that the Amendment’s prohibition against “any suit” cannot be
applied literally because it would lead to the anomalous conclusion
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3
4
5
6

134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 15.
Id.
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983).
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that in-state citizens can invoke federal question jurisdiction to sue a
state but out-of-state citizens cannot. The purpose of the Amendment,
they say, was merely to prohibit those suits in which jurisdiction rests
solely on the state-citizen diversity clauses of Article III, not to curtail
jurisdiction over suits against states supported by any of Article III’s
other heads of jurisdiction.
Ironically, both groups criticize each other for ignoring aspects of
the constitutional text. For example, proponents of broad immunity
argue that the diversity theory contradicts the Amendment’s express
prohibition against extending the judicial power to “any suit” by an
out-of-state citizen against a state because the theory would allow just
such suits under federal question jurisdiction. Conversely, diversity
theorists charge that broad immunity disregards the Eleventh
Amendment’s precise terms, which preclude jurisdiction over suits by
out-of-state citizens but say nothing to bar suits brought by citizens
against their own states.
The “compromise” theory of the Eleventh Amendment attempts to
avoid these criticisms by accepting the Amendment as written. This
theory suggests that the Amendment reflects an unrecorded, and less
than fully coherent, compromise.7 On this view, courts should simply
follow the text and ignore any resulting anomalies.8 According to the
proponents of this theory, it is simply not possible to discover the original meaning of the Amendment or to identify its precise purpose.9
Understood in light of the shift from the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution, however, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment
were neither underinclusive, overinclusive, nor an incoherent compromise. Rather, they were a carefully crafted response to widespread
demands following Chisholm v. Georgia10 for an amendment that
would remove or explain any provision of the Constitution that could
be construed to permit individuals to sue states in federal court. The
only provisions that anyone had ever suggested might authorize such
suits were the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III. Although the utility of original meaning as a guide to interpretation remains contested, this Article starts from the assumption that the original meaning is relevant both because the Supreme Court and leading
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 113 (1989) (“The amendment was a product of Federalist political prudence
and congressional compromise.”).
8 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989).
9 See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1722 (2004); cf. Andrew B. Coan, Essay, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511
(2006).
10 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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scholars have examined the Amendment in these terms, and because
the original meaning confirms the most natural reading of the text.
The keys to deciphering the Amendment are the Founders’ understandings that the new Constitution (1) did not authorize Congress to
exercise legislative power over states (as opposed to individuals), (2)
did not guarantee individuals affirmative relief against states, and (3)
did not grant the federal government coercive power to enforce federal
commands directly against states.
Given these assumptions (and the tradition of sovereign immunity),
the Founders appear to have assumed that only an express constitutional authorization could empower federal courts to hear suits against
states. The Founders publicly debated whether the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III constituted such authorization. Antifederalists charged that the power to hear suits between a state and outof-state citizens included the power to hear suits against states. Leading Federalists responded that these provisions should be construed to
permit jurisdiction only over suits by states against individuals. No
similar debate took place over whether federal question jurisdiction
permitted suits against states, perhaps because this provision did not
mention states and because the Founders may not have regarded suits
against states as necessary to enforce federal law. This background
helps to explain why the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment saw
their task as simply to close a loophole created by the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III. Given their assumptions about the
nature of the Union, the Founders would not have understood the
Constitution to authorize federal question suits against states. Thus,
they would not have understood the Eleventh Amendment to create
the anomaly between in-state and out-of-state citizens that modern
theorists perceive.
The Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to command
states to provide money, troops, and supplies to the central government, but provided no means of enforcement. The Founders concluded that the only way to make the Articles effective was to empower Congress to use military force to coerce state compliance with its
commands. The Founders rejected reliance on coercive force, however, because they believed it would lead to a civil war.11 The Constitutional Convention consciously drafted the Constitution to avoid the
need for coercive power by granting Congress legislative power over
individuals rather than states and by giving individuals only negative
rights against states. During the ratification debates, one of the Fed–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1780 (1997) (“The Founders rejected the prevalent system because they believed that duties
could be enforced against political bodies only through military force.”).
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eralists’ most powerful arguments against the Articles and in favor of
the Constitution was that only the Constitution avoided the need to introduce coercive power against states. The argument was so powerful
that Antifederalists largely abandoned the Articles as beyond repair
and focused on ways to improve the Constitution (by, for example,
proposing a Bill of Rights).
During ratification, however, Antifederalists threatened to undermine the Federalists’ structural case for the Constitution by pointing
out that Article III could be construed as an express authorization for
federal courts to hear suits against states by citizens of another state or
a foreign state. Such suits, they pointed out, would create the very enforcement problems that Federalists insisted the Constitution was designed to avoid. Leading Federalists responded by denying that Article III would be construed to permit suits against states by
individuals. Rather, they argued that it should be construed to confer
jurisdiction only over cases in which a state was a plaintiff. A broader
construction, they argued, would serve no purpose, because any recovery against a state for its debts could not be enforced “without waging
war against the contracting State.”12 They maintained that to ascribe,
by implication, “a power which would involve such a consequence,
would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.”13
Notwithstanding such Federalist assurances, the Supreme Court in
Chisholm construed Article III to encompass a suit against a state by a
citizen of another state. Federalists and Antifederalists immediately
united to amend the Constitution to preclude Article III from being
construed in this fashion. There was widespread sentiment that the
Constitution should neither permit individuals to sue states nor empower the federal government to coerce state compliance with any resulting judgments. The Founders adopted the Eleventh Amendment
to “explain” Article III and restore their preferred construction of the
judicial power. Framing the Amendment as an explanatory amendment had several distinct advantages. It restored the construction of
Article III that Federalists had promised during the ratification debates; it rebuked the Supreme Court for its contrary construction; and
it applied retroactively to deny jurisdiction over all pending suits
against states.
Viewed from the Founders’ perspective, the Eleventh Amendment
would have provided a fully coherent, even elegant, solution to the
problem posed by Chisholm’s interpretation of Article III. The
Amendment cuts across all jurisdictional categories in Article III by
denying federal courts judicial power to hear “any suit” against a state
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12
13

THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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brought by a prohibited plaintiff. Modern commentators find this
anomalous because the text — read literally — would prohibit out-ofstate citizens from bringing federal question suits against states, but
leave in-state citizens free to do so. This anomaly disappears, however, if one assumes (as the Founders did) that the original Constitution
does not give individuals affirmative rights against states and does not
repeat the “great and radical vice” of authorizing “legislation for states
or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities.”14 Accordingly, not even the most alarmist Antifederalists suggested during ratification that in-state citizens could sue states using federal question
jurisdiction. Rather, the Founders assumed that individuals could
never bring any federal question suits against states. This forgotten
context regarding the nature of the Union explains why no one at the
time saw any anomaly in the Eleventh Amendment’s text.
By the same token, the Eleventh Amendment itself provides important evidence regarding the Founders’ understanding of the nature of
the Union under the Constitution. During the ratification debates, no
one suggested that federal question jurisdiction could be construed to
authorize individuals to sue states because the Founders assumed that
the Constitution neither imposed — nor empowered Congress to impose — obligations on states that would require coercive enforcement.
Indeed, an error by one Federalist writer forced him to acknowledge
publicly that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant”
the conclusion “that the original jurisdiction of the federal court extends to cases between a state and its own citizens.”15 Given this assumption, the debate between Federalists and Antifederalists
over state suability focused exclusively on whether out-of-state
citizens could sue states using the state-citizen diversity provisions of
Article III. The terms of the Eleventh Amendment reflect this understanding of the Constitution. By barring out-of-state citizens from
bringing “any suit” against a state in federal court, the Founders understood the Amendment to restore parity — not introduce disparity
— between these groups. In this sense, the terms of the Amendment
reflect the Founders’ original conception of the Union created by the
Constitution.
Part I examines three current theories of the Eleventh Amendment
— the immunity theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise
theory — and explains that all three start from the questionable premise that the Amendment created an anomalous or absurd distinction
between in-state and out-of-state citizens. Part II examines the draft–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14
15

at 1.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 108.
Aristides, Letter to the People of Maryland, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, April 1, 1788,
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ing and ratification of the Constitution, and the fundamental decision
to abandon legislative power over states under the Articles of Confederation in favor of exclusive reliance on legislative power over individuals. This shift allowed the Constitution to enforce federal commands
without introducing coercive force against states. Part III describes
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia and subsequent
efforts to adopt a constitutional amendment to remove or explain any
clause in the Constitution that could be construed to permit individuals to sue states. Part IV argues that the Eleventh Amendment was
designed to overturn Chisholm and to restore the Founders’ preferred
construction of Article III. In historical context, the Amendment
would not have been understood to create anomalous results because
the Founders did not expect federal question jurisdiction to generate
any suits by any citizens against any states. Finally, Part V considers
several potential implications of the historical understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment. Because the Amendment makes sense in historical context, the absurdity doctrine provides no justification for ignoring its precise terms. This context also helps to explain why the
Court prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity
under its Article I, Section 8 powers, but allows abrogation when Congress invokes its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. The
former powers were designed to avoid a civil war, whereas the latter
powers were granted in response to the Civil War.
II. CURRENT THEORIES OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment go beyond the
words of the Amendment without a fully convincing theoretical basis.
On the one hand, for more than a century the Supreme Court has
treated the Amendment as merely indicative of a broader underlying
constitutional immunity. This “immunity” theory maintains that the
Amendment is not the exclusive, or even the primary, source of state
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, beginning in the 1980s, several prominent academics and a minority of the Court embraced the
“diversity” theory of the Eleventh Amendment. This theory “contends
that the amendment merely required a narrow construction of constitutional language affirmatively authorizing federal court jurisdiction
[between a state and citizens of another state or a foreign state] and
that the amendment did nothing to prohibit federal court jurisdiction
[in federal question cases].”16 Both theories have recently received increased scrutiny from textualists who claim that neither is consistent
with the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. They hypothesize a third
possibility — namely, that the text of the Amendment reflects an unre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16

Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1034.
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corded and perhaps incoherent compromise. Under this “compromise”
theory, courts should follow the text of the Amendment without regard
to any resulting anomalies. Each of these theories rests on the premise
that the text of the Eleventh Amendment creates an illogical distinction between in-state and out-of-state citizens. The perceived anomaly
disappears, however, when the Amendment is placed in the broader
historical context of the shift from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution.
A. The Immunity Theory
The immunity theory — the Supreme Court’s dominant approach
since 1890 — regards the text of the Eleventh Amendment as underinclusive, and therefore recognizes more state sovereign immunity than
the text provides. On this view, the Amendment is simply a partial
confirmation of the states’ broader, preexisting immunity under the
Constitution. According to its adherents, this understanding is necessary to avoid the absurd result that out-of-state citizens are barred
from suing states in federal courts in all cases, but in-state citizens are
free to bring such suits if otherwise permitted by Article III. Thus,
under this approach, the Supreme Court has come to understand “the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for
the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.”17
Some background is useful to understand the emergence of the
immunity theory. In Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court interpreted Article III (and the Judiciary Act of 1789) to permit a citizen of
South Carolina to sue Georgia without its consent. As Professor (now
Judge) William Fletcher has noted, “[t]he reaction to Chisholm was
immediate and hostile.”18 Constitutional amendments were introduced
in both the House and Senate within two days of the decision,19 and
numerous states, led by Massachusetts, urged Congress to adopt “such
amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will remove
any clause or article of the said Constitution which can be construed to
imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer in any
suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United
States.”20

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18
19
20

Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1058.
See infra notes 439–442 and accompanying text.
Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, Sept. 27, 1793, reprinted in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800,
at 440 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]; see infra notes 431–437 and accompanying text.
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Congress responded by approving the Eleventh Amendment and
sending it to the states for ratification in March 1794.21 By February
1795, three-quarters of the states had approved the Amendment.22 In
response, the Supreme Court dismissed all pending suits against states
from its docket on the ground “that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any
case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”23 The Supreme Court had few occasions to apply the Eleventh Amendment
prior to the Civil War, presumably because out-of-state and foreign citizens recognized that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear their
suits against states and because Congress had not yet granted lower
federal courts general federal question jurisdiction.24
More extensive consideration came after Congress extended general
federal question jurisdiction to lower federal courts in 1875. Just as
the states’ efforts to avoid their debts following the Revolutionary War
led individuals to sue states in the 1790s, similar state efforts following
the Civil War led individuals to sue states at the end of the nineteenth
century. On this occasion, however, plaintiffs were armed with the
Contracts Clause, which the Supreme Court had since interpreted to
apply to public as well as private contracts.25 For example, following
Reconstruction, Louisiana effectively repudiated its debts by amending
its constitution and laws to impede repayment.26 These actions produced several important decisions.
Until 1890, the Supreme Court’s decisions were consistent with the
text of the Eleventh Amendment: federal courts could not entertain
any suit — whether based on a federal question or diversity —
brought against a state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign
state.27 In Hans v. Louisiana,28 however, the Court looked beyond the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 66–
67 (1972).
22 Id. at 67.
23 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798).
24 The Supreme Court did have appellate jurisdiction in federal question cases, but this led to
only limited consideration of the Amendment. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the Supreme Court from hearing a federal question appeal in a criminal case brought by a state against its own citizen in state
court).
25 See infra note 547 and accompanying text.
26 See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 63–66 (1987).
27 See Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 720 (1883) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred a federal question suit by out-of-state bondholders against state officers in
their official capacity because it amounted to a suit against the state); see also New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–89 (1883) (dismissing a suit between states under the Eleventh
Amendment because an individual was the real party in interest).
28 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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terms of the Amendment and dismissed a citizen’s suit against his own
state. Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sued Louisiana in federal court for
repudiating its bonds in violation of the Contracts Clause. Hans argued that he was “not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh
Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against
a State which are brought by the citizens of another State.”29 The
Court acknowledged that “the amendment does so read,” but suggested
that there was another “reason or ground for abating his suit.”30 According to the Court, the Eleventh Amendment “shows that, on this
question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest authority of this country was in accord rather with the minority than
with the majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v.
Georgia.”31 Invoking the Founding-era “views of those great advocates
and defenders of the Constitution” (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall),32 the Court concluded that “the cognizance of
suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was
not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial
power of the United States.”33 The Court read the Eleventh Amendment to confirm this understanding: “Can we suppose that, when the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open
for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states,
was indignantly repelled?”34 The Court viewed this supposition as
“almost an absurdity on its face.”35
Since Hans, the Supreme Court has largely adhered to, and even
expanded, its broad view of state sovereign immunity beyond the
terms of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, in Monaco v. Mississippi,36 the Court held that it lacks “jurisdiction to entertain a suit
brought by a foreign State against a State without her consent,”37 notwithstanding Article III’s extension of the judicial power to controversies “between a State . . . and foreign States,”38 and the Eleventh
Amendment’s conspicuous failure to restrict this jurisdiction. The
Court refused to “rest with a mere literal application of the words” of
Article III or to “assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
292 U.S. 313 (1934).
Id. at 320.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States.”39
According to the Court, states are “immune from suits, without their
consent, save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention.”40 Although the Court found that states surrendered their immunity with respect to suits brought by sister states
and by the United States,41 it concluded that Article III does not authorize federal courts to adjudicate disputes between a state and a foreign state without the “previous consent of the parties.”42
In the twentieth century, Congress began the novel practice of regulating states as part of its broader legislative agenda, and eventually
authorized suits by individuals against states to enforce congressional
commands. The Supreme Court has generally prevented congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, first by imposing clear statement rules43 and ultimately by holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida44 that Congress lacks power to do so under Article I, Section
8.45 Adhering to the purposive approach of Hans, the Court stated
that the “dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man.”46 According to the Court, “we long
have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of.’”47
Alden v. Maine48 demonstrates the depth of the Supreme Court’s
commitment to the proposition that state sovereign immunity does not
rest solely on the Eleventh Amendment.49 Alden invalidated a congressional attempt to subject states to suit in state court to enforce
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39
40

Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322.
Id. at 322–23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at
487) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id. at 330.
42 Id. at 324 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 557 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]).
43 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
44 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
45 At the same time, the Court has permitted Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976).
46 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69.
47 Id. (quoting Monaco, 292 U.S. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Despite the
Court’s strong rhetoric, Professor Henry Monaghan points out that Seminole Tribe “in fact left
firmly in place the fundamental reality of state accountability in federal court for violation of federal law” because of the continuing availability of suits against state officers. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 103 (1996).
48 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
49 The decision has drawn criticism because it goes well beyond the text. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1011, 1047 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1664–75 (2000).
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claims arising under a federal statute. Because the Eleventh Amendment concerns only the “[j]udicial power of the United States,”50 the
plaintiffs argued that the Amendment was inapplicable. The Court
stressed that “sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.”51 According to the Court, the Amendment “confirmed, rather
than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle.”52
On this view, “the bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive
description of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit.”53 Relying on “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design,”54
the Court concluded that “the States retain immunity from private suit
in their own courts,”55 and that Congress lacks “authority under Article I to abrogate” such immunity.56
B. The Diversity Theory
While the immunity theory regards the text of the Eleventh
Amendment as clearly underinclusive, the diversity theory views it as
unacceptably overinclusive. The diversity theory would narrow the
Amendment’s express prohibition by permitting out-of-state citizens
and aliens to sue states whenever they can invoke a category of Article
III jurisdiction other than state-citizen diversity. On this view, the
Eleventh Amendment merely prevents federal courts from hearing
suits against states when jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of
a diverse citizen or an alien. Like immunity theorists, diversity theorists use their approach to avoid what they perceive to be the Amendment’s anomalous distinction between in-state and out-of-state citizens. Applying the Amendment “literally,” they point out, would lead
to the “unlikely result” that “[a]ll suits brought against a state by an
out-of-state citizen are prohibited regardless of the existence of a federal question, but at the same time any suit brought against a state by
a citizen of that state is permitted, provided a federal question exists.”57 In their view, the Founders could not have intended this distinction, so diversity theorists would narrow the Amendment to avoid
this result.
Professor William Fletcher and Judge John Gibbons each articulated versions of this theory in 1983, and Justice Brennan (joined by a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 728.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 741; see also id. at 754.
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1060–61.
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minority of the Supreme Court) adopted it two years later.58 Fletcher
explicitly characterized his project as an attempt to recover the original intent of those who drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amendment.59 He argued that the Eleventh Amendment “was intended to
require that the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed
to confer federal jurisdiction only over disputes in which the state was
a plaintiff.”60 In other words, “the eleventh amendment forbade nothing, but merely required this limiting construction on the jurisdiction
granted by the state-citizen diversity clause.”61 On this view, “the
amendment said nothing about a private citizen’s ability to sue an unconsenting state under federal question jurisdiction or in admiralty.”62
Like Professor Fletcher, Judge Gibbons rejected strict application
of the Eleventh Amendment’s text as contrary to “the probable intention of its drafters.”63 While acknowledging that “the amendment
might be read literally to reach all suits by a citizen of one state or foreign nation against another state, including federal question claims,”64
he thought that “a literal reading of the amendment as qualifying article III, § 2 in its entirety would be illogical” because it would mean
that “a state’s own citizens could sue it although the citizens of other
states could not.”65 Accordingly, he argued that the Amendment “did
nothing more than amend article III, section 2 of the Constitution to
eliminate the power of federal courts to hear suits against states in
which the sole basis for jurisdiction was the status of the parties.”66
On this view, the Amendment was little more than “a clever maneuver
by the Federalists to deflect republican opposition to Chisholm, while
preserving the power of federal courts to hear claims arising under the
1783 peace treaty.”67
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
58 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–61, 286–87 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Prior to 1985, Justice Brennan adhered to the “literal wording” of the Amendment,
which he regarded as “a flat prohibition against the federal judiciary’s entertainment of suits
against even a consenting State brought by citizens of another State or by aliens.” Employees v.
Mo. Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 310 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59 See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1037–38.
60 Id. at 1035. This argument is in tension with the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which
limits the “Judicial power of the United States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XI, not merely “the statecitizen diversity clause of article III.” Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1035.
61 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1035.
62 Id. at 1036. On the underlying question, Fletcher concluded that “it was unclear whether,
under the constitutional structure considered as a whole, the states were otherwise immune from
private suit under federal question and admiralty jurisdiction.” Id. at 1037; see id. at 1071–72.
63 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1937 n.257 (1983).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1894.
67 Id. at 2004.
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Two years later, Justice Brennan abandoned his literal approach to
the Eleventh Amendment and embraced the diversity theory.68 In his
view, scholars had “discovered and collated substantial evidence that
the Court’s constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity has
rested on a mistaken historical premise.”69 Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded that “the Eleventh Amendment has no relevance” when
“federal jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question.”70
Three additional Justices signed Justice Brennan’s opinion, and (notwithstanding changes on the Court) at least three Justices have continued to advocate the diversity theory in dissent.71
C. The Compromise Theory
A third group of commentators has more recently suggested that
courts should simply accept the text of the Eleventh Amendment as an
unrecorded compromise rather than try to implement its elusive purpose. They argue that both the immunity and diversity theories contradict the text of the Amendment in several important respects. Like
immunity and diversity theorists, compromise theorists regard the
Amendment as poorly drafted. Compromise theorists nonetheless favor adhering closely to the text in order to uphold whatever compromise is embedded therein. Accordingly, they take issue with both the
immunity theory and the diversity theory.
Compromise theorists like Professor John Manning stress that the
immunity theory justifies going beyond the text on the ground that
“the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose was not merely to limit the federal judicial power in cases involving the party alignments described
by the Amendment’s precise text, but also to repudiate Chisholm and
all that it stood for.”72 Using this approach, “the Court has extended
state sovereign immunity to include federal lawsuits filed by a state’s
own citizens, by federal corporations, by tribal sovereigns, and by foreign nations.”73 Similarly, although the Amendment refers to “any suit
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–61, 286–87 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69 Id. at 258–59.
70 Id. at 301.
71 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 109–12 (1996) (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens is at least skeptical of the diversity theory. See
id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the
Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to ensure that [a federal] cause of action may be
enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen.”).
72 Manning, supra note 9, at 1682.
73 Id. at 1666 (footnotes omitted) (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,
781–82 (1991) (upholding sovereign immunity in a suit brought by a tribe against a state); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331–32 (1934) (holding that sovereign immunity
bars a suit by a foreign nation against an unconsenting state); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449
(1900) (recognizing sovereign immunity in a suit by a federal corporation against a state); Hans v.
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in law or equity,” the Court recognizes sovereign immunity in suits in
admiralty as well.74 Finally, although the Amendment is written as a
limitation on the “Judicial power of the United States,” the Court has
recently ruled that sovereign immunity bars suits against states both in
state courts75 and before federal administrative agencies.76
Compromise theorists point out that the diversity theory also looks
beyond the text by elevating the perceived purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment over its terms. At first glance, the diversity theory appears to be more consistent with the text than the immunity theory because the former focuses on the parallel language of Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, Professor Akhil Amar has gone so far
as to say that the diversity theory “makes perfect sense of all the words
of the Amendment itself.”77 Professor Lawrence Marshall points out,
however, that this purported “allegiance to the text” is at best “partial”
and therefore “deceptive.”78 In his view, “the diversity theory goes on
completely to ignore the operative words of the amendment, which
provide that ‘[t]he judicial power shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity’ that meets the criteria set forth in the
amendment.”79 The reference to “any suit” signals a more comprehensive prohibition than diversity theorists would allow. Similarly, the
Amendment is framed as a restriction on “[t]he Judicial power” and
therefore limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized by Article III.80
Thus, by permitting federal courts to hear federal question suits
against a state by citizens of another state, “the diversity theory does
precisely what the amendment forbids.”81
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1890) (extending sovereign immunity to a suit by a Louisiana citizen
against Louisiana)).
74 Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
75 Manning, supra note 9, at 1666; see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
76 Manning, supra note 9, at 1666; see Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 760–61 (2002). Textualists like Manning object to these developments because “the specific
text of the Eleventh Amendment, read in context, appears to convey a negative implication that
should preclude the derivation of further classes of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court.” Manning, supra note 9, at 1671; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1476 (1987) (arguing that the result in Hans “contradict[s] the unambiguous limitations of the Eleventh Amendment’s text”).
77 Amar, supra note 76, at 1481; see also id. at 1482 (“[I]t would have been difficult to come up
with wording that expressed better than does the Amendment’s final text a simple desire to effect
a partial repeal of two technical diverse party grants.”).
78 See Marshall, supra note 8, at 1347.
79 Id. (alteration in original).
80 See Massey, supra note 7, at 65 (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment “sought to create
a party based denial of jurisdiction to the federal courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional
heads of Article III”).
81 Marshall, supra note 8, at 1347; see also William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1380 (1989) (“The text of
the eleventh amendment does not limit its protection to suits based upon diversity; its language
applies to all suits, whether based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction.”). For Fletcher’s
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Because they agree with immunity and diversity theorists that the
Eleventh Amendment does not make perfect sense, compromise theorists conclude that the Amendment must reflect an unrecorded compromise rather than a coherent approach to state suability. For example, Marshall argues that “the distinctions that the amendment so
clearly draws can be understood as efforts to accommodate the competing values of state immunity from federal suit and state accountability within the constitutional system.”82 He hypothesizes that states
were most concerned with suits by out-of-state citizens (rather than
their own citizens) because out-of-state speculators had purchased disputed western lands and state war debts at deep discounts.83 Although Marshall acknowledges that at least some in-state citizens had
similar claims, he suggests that states may have found compensating
their own citizens less objectionable.84
Manning also believes that the Supreme Court should enforce “the
Eleventh Amendment as written.”85 He argues that even if one assumes that there was a broad consensus in favor of comprehensive
state sovereign immunity, “the mere existence of a social or political
consensus contrary to the text cannot carry the heavy burden required
to justify deviating from such a text, especially in constitutional law.”86
The reason is that “the Article V amendment process does not seamlessly translate . . . even widespread social sentiment into law.”87
Thus, “it is conceivable that one-third of either house (or, less likely,
one-quarter of the state legislatures) might have preferred the narrower
immunity embedded in the text.”88 In other words, the Amendment

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
response, see William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989).
82 Marshall, supra note 8, at 1345.
83 Id. at 1362–66.
84 See id. at 1366. Marshall recognizes that his defense of the text does pose at least one “perplexing problem” — namely, assignment of claims to in-state citizens. Id. at 1367 n.113. Marshall
acknowledges that the Supreme Court would likely uphold such assignments. See id. He suggests that the ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment may have either considered this a “small loophole[]” or assumed that courts would not “allow plaintiffs to circumvent the amendment by assigning debts to eligible plaintiffs.” Id. This suggestion seems implausible given that the prospect
of suits by out-of-state citizens against states arose because in-state citizens sold their bonds to
out-of-state speculators. Id. at 1365–66. If these initial assignments were valid, there is little reason to think that courts would disallow reassignments to in-state citizens.
85 Manning, supra note 9, at 1722.
86 Id. at 1720. But see Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern
Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (2009) (arguing that
textualists should honor the inherent compromise contained in Article III by upholding a background principle of state sovereign immunity).
87 Manning, supra note 9, at 1720.
88 Id.
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may represent “the fruits of a (potentially unrecorded) compromise.”89
Indeed, Manning does not “think it possible ever to know the true reason, if one exists, for the final shape of the Amendment’s text.”90 As
explained in Part II, however, there is a largely forgotten historical
context that helps to explain why the text of the Amendment would
have made sense to those who adopted it.91
D. The Inadequacy of Current Theories
All major theories of the Eleventh Amendment — the immunity
theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise theory — start from
the assumption that the Amendment is either poorly drafted or
represents an awkward compromise. Given the history of the
Amendment’s adoption, neither proposition rings true. The Hans
Court considered the Amendment to be underinclusive in relation to
its apparent background purpose of restoring comprehensive state sovereign immunity. The diversity theory similarly builds on the presupposition that the text of the Amendment is overinclusive in relation to
its assumed purpose of eliminating only state-citizen diversity jurisdiction under Article III. Thus, both theories draw on the doctrine of
strong purposivism to make a claim of inadvertent drafting.92 Even
the leading textualist theories do not regard the Amendment as reflecting the considered expression of a coherent policy, but assume that it

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 Id. at 1721. Professor Andrew Coan also advocates following the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. Because there is no “perfectly satisfying explanation” for the text’s distinction between out-of-state and in-state citizens, he believes that courts should follow the text in order to
end the costly war between the immunity and diversity theories. Coan, supra note 9, at 2532.
90 Manning, supra note 9, at 1722. Professor Thomas Lee has recently suggested that a literal
reading of the Eleventh Amendment makes sense in light of principles of international law known
to the Founders. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International
Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027 (2002). Specifically, he argues that the
Amendment “is essentially just a negative formulation of the affirmative international law rule”
that “only states have rights against other states.” Id. at 1028.
91 Professor Caleb Nelson has recently argued that “many members of the Founding generation thought that a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ did not exist unless both sides either voluntarily appeared or could be haled before the court.” Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2002). Because traditionally “courts could
not command unconsenting states to appear at the behest of an individual,” a state’s failure to
consent meant that “there would be no ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’” under Article III. Id. In effect,
Nelson maintains that there was no “Case” because federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction
over unconsenting states. Id. The Eleventh Amendment took a different approach by withdrawing subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by prohibited plaintiffs against states. Id. at
1566. Nelson suggests that the Supreme Court’s failure to distinguish between these two types of
immunity has contributed to doctrinal confusion. Id.
92 Cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454–55 (1989); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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represents the fruits of an awkward compromise, which must be enforced as written even if it does not make much sense.93
Immunity and diversity theorists implicitly rely on the idea that the
Eleventh Amendment as written produces “absurd results” that the
Supreme Court is justified in rectifying. The absurdity doctrine permits courts to ignore a legal text when its application leads to absurd
results. The doctrine is based on the idea that lawmakers often draft
in haste, act with imperfect foresight, and write laws in unavoidably
imprecise language.94 Hence, where a law’s conventional meaning is
dramatically at odds with some broadly and deeply held social value
(such as the immunity of the states from suit or the enforcement of
federal law), an interpreter presumes that the result was an unintended
failure of expression by the lawmaker. On this view, it serves rather
than disserves legislative supremacy for courts to approximate what
the lawmaker would have done if the offending application had come
to its attention.95 In this vein, immunity and diversity theorists
would expand or contract the immunity conveyed by the text of
the Eleventh Amendment in order to bring it into line with their views
of its true purpose. Textualists would enforce the Amendment as written, but only on the assumption that the text represents an awkward
compromise.
None of these presuppositions seems persuasive in this context.
First, the Eleventh Amendment does not fit the usual profile for absurdity. Typically, absurdity involves an overgeneralization that produces results that the drafters could not have anticipated.96 While absurdity might also include an omitted case,97 it seems unlikely that the
Amendment was the product of inadvertent drafting. The question of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
93 Cf. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Compromises draw unprincipled lines between situations that strike an outside observer as
all but identical. The limitation is part of the price of the victory achieved, a concession to opponents who might have been able to delay or block a bill even slightly more favorable to the
proponents.”).
94 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2400–02 (2003).
95 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 172 (1896) (holding that “an
absurdity cannot be imputed to the legislature”); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385,
396 (1868) (noting that courts have authority to correct “absurdity, which the legislature ought not
to be presumed to have intended”); see also E. Russell Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule, 15 CANADIAN B. REV. 689, 692 (1937) (describing absurdity as an “extreme departure
from commonly accepted principles of morality, philsophy, politics, or convenience”).
96 See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (finding it absurd to apply a broad prohibition against importation of persons to perform “labor or service of any kind” to a pastor hired to
minister to a congregation); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (finding a prohibition on obstruction of the mail absurd as applied to a local law enforcement officer who arrested a
mail carrier for murder while the latter was delivering mail).
97 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (finding it absurd to permit individuals, but not corporations, to take advantage of expedited review provisions governing challenges to the Line Item Veto Act).
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sovereign immunity had been much debated by a sophisticated political community both before and after ratification. In the view of many,
an amendment was necessitated by the Convention’s careless drafting
of Article III. Although the Hans Court described the Amendment as
reflecting the swift reaction to a shock of surprise that swept the nation, in fact the final version of the Amendment was not adopted until
the next session of Congress, after several alternatives had been
considered.98
Second, although in some sense all laws represent a compromise of
sorts,99 it seems odd to suggest that the Eleventh Amendment
represented the awkward compromise typically associated with sharply divided forces. The commentary and debates surrounding the
Amendment show no sign of real disagreement concerning either the
goal of the Amendment or its scope. Indeed, it is undisputed that Federalists — whose express representations about Article III were overridden by the Court in Chisholm — joined Antifederalists in both calling for an amendment and passing it by overwhelming margins in
both the House and the Senate.100 Of course, it is true that compromises often occur outside the glare of public view and that “[i]t is not
the law that [an adopted text] can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.”101 It seems telling, however,
that on an issue as important and contentious as this one, there is no
evidence of major divisions of political opinion as to how far the
Amendment should go.
The impetus behind all three theories is that the Eleventh Amendment does not give a satisfactory account of federal question jurisdiction. The problem, however, does not stem from our understanding of
the Amendment, but rather from the faulty assumption that the nature
of the Union permitted individuals to sue states using federal question
jurisdiction. My hypothesis is that the Eleventh Amendment, in fact,
did what everyone expected it to do — to reaffirm the absence of judicial power to hear suits by individuals against states — when understood in light of widely shared beliefs about the limits of federal power
and the proper means of enforcing constitutional prohibitions against
states. That understanding may have been lost even by the time the
Court decided Hans in 1890. At the time the Amendment was
adopted, however, no one suggested that it was over- or underinclusive
in relation to the apparent goal of restoring the preferred pre-Chisholm
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
98
99
100

See infra section IV.C, pp. 1891–94.
See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 125 (1999).
For example, Massachusetts Federalists Theodore Sedgwick and Caleb Strong played key
roles in the drafting and congressional passage of the Amendment. See infra sections IV.B and C,
pp. 1886–94.
101 Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988).
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understanding of Article III. The reason appears to be that virtually
all participants in framing and adopting the Amendment shared the
same background assumptions — that the Constitution conferred no
power on the federal government to regulate or coerce states, and that
the Constitution imposed no affirmative obligations on states necessitating suits by individuals against states. Only an express constitutional provision authorizing suits against states would suffice to override these assumptions. The Founders debated whether the statecitizen diversity clauses of Article III expressly authorized such suits,
and the Chisholm Court subsequently construed them to do so. There
was no similar debate regarding federal question jurisdiction. In light
of this background, the Eleventh Amendment as written offered a
complete and coherent solution to the problem posed by the statecitizen diversity provisions of Article III — the only provisions of the
Constitution that anyone ever suggested might expressly authorize individuals to sue states.
III. THE LOST HISTORICAL CONTEXT
OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Taken in historical context, the Eleventh Amendment should not be
understood as the product of an incoherent compromise or faulty
drafting. Rather, one can make sense of the Amendment as written if
it is read against the backdrop of the Founders’ deeply and widely
held understanding that the Constitution did not authorize Congress
either to enact legislation for states or to coerce state compliance with
federal commands. This understanding emerged from the difficulties
that the Founders experienced under the Articles of Confederation,
and was offered repeatedly during the Philadelphia Convention and
the ratification debates as one of the Constitution’s primary advantages over competing proposals to amend the Articles.
In drafting and ratifying the Constitution, prominent Founders
consistently maintained that the nature of the Union was such that
federal commands could be enforced only against individuals, but not
against states. To understand this, one must revisit the central debate
over whether to revise the Articles or adopt an entirely new Constitution. The Articles, of course, authorized Congress to requisition money, supplies, and personnel from the states, but provided no means of
enforcement. The Founders considered, but did not adopt, proposals
to amend the Articles to give Congress express power to use military
force to coerce delinquent states to comply with requisitions. Similar
proposals were made at the Constitutional Convention, but were rejected because the delegates feared that the use of such a power would
lead to a civil war. The Convention avoided this danger by making
the fundamental decision — which some regard as the genius of the
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Constitution — to substitute individuals for states as the objects of
congressional power.
During the ratification debates, leading Federalists emphasized this
feature of the Constitution as its primary advantage over proposals to
retain the Articles of Confederation. Federalists and Antifederalists
alike ultimately agreed that the Articles could not be salvaged without
introducing coercive power against states — a power that the Founders widely regarded as impracticable, cruel, and unjust. Accordingly,
they decided to abandon the Articles and adopt a constitution in its
place that could be enforced solely against individuals. This background helps to make sense of the Eleventh Amendment because it
suggests (a) that the Founders did not understand federal question jurisdiction to encompass coercive suits by individuals against states,
and (b) that the Founders regarded the Amendment as sufficient to
implement the widely held view that individuals should not be able to
sue states in federal court.
A. The Articles of Confederation
On June 12, 1776, the Continental Congress authorized a committee to prepare a plan of confederation.102 Serious problems arose under the Articles of Confederation even before they were approved by
all thirteen states. A crucial issue was how Congress would raise sufficient revenue to pay for national defense and the general welfare. On
paper, the Articles obligated the states to supply whatever requisitions
Congress demanded.103 According to Article XIII, “Every state shall
abide by the determinations of the united states in congress assembled,
on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them.”104
In practice, however, the lack of any enforcement mechanism left
states free both to second guess the necessity of requisitions and to pay
less than their full quota.105 The states’ inability or refusal to comply
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102 See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
53 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 DHRC].
103 Article VIII provided that federal expenses “shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,
which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each
state.” Draft of the Articles of Confederation (July 12, 1776), in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 79,
89. Article VIII also specified that the “taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied
by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time agreed upon
by the united states in congress assembled.” Id.
104 ACT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Nov. 15, 1777), reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 86, 93.
105 As Alexander Hamilton remarked, the states’ “jealousy of all power not in their own
hands . . . has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety or necessity.” Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1779–1781, at 400, 401 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961) [hereinafter
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fully with federal requisitions was notorious during the Confederation
era.106
By 1780, Congress recognized the need to amend the Articles to
confer additional powers, particularly with respect to raising revenue.
Congress considered two basic approaches: empower Congress to bypass the states by imposing taxes directly or empower Congress to
coerce states to comply with requisitions. Congress proposed the first
approach on February 3, 1781,107 but this proposal died in 1782 when
Rhode Island refused to ratify the amendment and Virginia rescinded
its earlier approval.108 More importantly for present purposes, Congress also considered several proposals to use military force to coerce
state compliance with requisitions.
The movement began in 1780 in response to a notorious incident.
General Washington petitioned Congress for resources to launch an offensive to recapture New York City from the British.109 Congress requisitioned money from the states, but failed to receive sufficient
funds.110 Washington cancelled the offensive, and Governor Clinton
responded by seeking an amendment to the Articles that would empower Congress to coerce state compliance with requisitions. The
New York General Assembly proposed amending the Articles by
providing:
[W]henever it shall appear to [Congress], that any State is deficient in furnishing the Quota of Men, Money, Provisions or other Supplies, required
of such State, that Congress direct the Commander in Chief, without Delay, to march the Army or such Part of it as may be requisite, into such
State, and by a Military Force, compel it to furnish its Deficiency.111

The New York Assembly sent its proposal not only to Congress,
but also to the upcoming Hartford Convention of five northeastern
states, which met on November 8, 1780 to consider defects in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
HAMILTON PAPERS]. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12,
at 111.
106 George Washington observed: “One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or
so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill, and ever shall be. . . .” Letter from
George Washington to Fielding Lewis (July 6, 1780), in WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
154, 157 n.1 (Lawrence B. Evans ed., 1908) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Joseph
Jones, in Congress (May 31, 1780)).
107 See Grant of Power to Collect Import Duties (Feb. 3, 1781), reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra
note 102, at 140, 140.
108 See id.
109 See KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION 66 (2001).
110 Id. at 67–68.
111 JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1780, at 43 (New York, Oct.
10, 1780); see 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 1032 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1912) [hereinafter JCC].
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Union.112 The convention endorsed a variation of the New York proposal, which would have authorized the Commander in Chief to initiate military action to enforce state compliance with requisitions, but
only during the years 1780 and 1781.113 Even this proposal was met
with alarm in some quarters.114 The speaker of the Massachusetts assembly remarked that military coercion ran contrary to “the Principles
on which our Opposition to Britain rests.”115 Although he regarded
General Washington as “a Good and a Great Man,” he cautioned that
“he is only a Man and therefore should not be vested with such
powers.”116
The proceedings of the Hartford Convention were presented to
Congress on December 12, 1780, and assigned to a five member committee that included James Madison.117 Although Madison favored
empowering Congress to coerce the states, he was outvoted.118 One of
the prevailing members of the committee wrote to the Governor of
New Jersey that the “resolution is of such a nature that I should never
give my voice for it.”119 He also predicted that General Washington
would not “accept or act in consequence of such powers.”120
Congress appointed Madison to another committee on March 6,
1781 “to prepare a plan to invest the United States in Congress assembled with full and explicit powers for effectually carrying into execution in the several states all acts or resolutions passed agreeably to the
Articles of Confederation.”121 This time, Madison’s views prevailed.122
On March 16, 1781, the committee proposed that Congress be given
authority to compel state compliance with requisitions through military force.123 The report (written largely by Madison) initially suggested that Congress might already have implied power under the Ar–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
112
113
114
115

See DOUGHERTY, supra note 109, at 133 & n.7.
See id.
See generally id. at 133–34.
Letter from James Warren to Samuel Adams (Dec. 4, 1780), in 2 WARREN-ADAMS
LETTERS 1778–1814, at 151, 152 (photo. reprint 1994) (1925).
116 Id. Even New York withdrew its support for a coercive power amendment after the British
left New York City. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 109, at 69.
117 See DOUGHERTY, supra note 109, at 134 n.10.
118 See id.
119 Letter from John Witherspoon to William Livingston, Governor of N.J. (Dec. 16, 1780), in 5
LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 487 (Edmund C. Burnett ed.,
1931).
120 Id.
121 19 JCC, supra note 111, at 236.
122 See DOUGHERTY, supra note 109, at 135.
123 See JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 25 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that Madison’s report proposed amending the Articles of
Confederation to “give the Union the power literally to coerce delinquent states into doing their
duty, either by marching the Continental army within their borders or by stationing armed ships
outside their harbors”).
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ticles to coerce states,124 but concluded that it is “most consonant to
the spirit of a free constitution that on the one hand all exercise of
power should be explicitly and precisely warranted, and on the other
that the penal consequences of a violation of duty should be clearly
promulgated and understood.”125 Accordingly, the report proposed
amending the Articles of Confederation as follows:
It is understood & hereby declared that in case any one or more of the
Confederated States shall refuse or neglect to abide by the determinations
of the United States in Congress assembled or to observe all the Articles of
Confederation as required in the 13th. Article, the said United States in
Congress assembled are fully authorised to employ the force of the United
States as well by sea as by land to compel such State or States to fulfill
their federal engagements, and particularly to make distraint on any of the
effects Vessels and Merchandizes of such State or States of any of the Citizens thereof wherever found, and to prohibit and prevent their trade and
intercourse as well with any other of the United States and the Citizens
thereof, as with any foreign State, and as well by land as by sea, until full
compensation or compliance be obtained with respect to all Requisitions
made by the United States in Congress assembled in pursuance of the Articles of Confederation.126

Despite Madison’s endorsement,127 Congress never proposed an amendment of this kind to the states.128
Alexander Hamilton may have reflected the general unease over
recommending coercive power against the states when he warned in
1782 that the grant of such authority might lead to a civil war:
A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle
sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of different members.
Force cannot effect it: A contest of arms will seldom be between the com-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
124 Amendment To Give Congress Coercive Power over the States and Their Citizens (Mar. 16,
1781), reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 141, 142 (stating that Article XIII of the Articles
vests “a general and implied power . . . in the United States in Congress assembled to enforce and
carry into effect all the Articles of the said Confederation against any of the States which shall
refuse or neglect to abide by such their determinations, or shall otherwise violate any of the said
Articles, but no determinate and particular provision is made for that purpose”).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 142–43.
127 Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson and explained that the “situation of most of the States
is such, that two or three vessels of force employed against their trade will make it their interest to
yield prompt obedience to all just requisitions on them.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 16, 1781), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 131–32 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1900) [hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS]. Although Madison sought his views on the proposal,
Jefferson apparently never replied.
128 See Amendment to Give Congress Coercive Power Over the States and Their Citizens (Mar.
16, 1781), reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 141, 141; Committee Report on Carrying the
Confederation into Effect and on Additional Powers Needed by Congress (Aug. 22, 1781), reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 143, 145 (discussing the more modest ideas ultimately
proposed).
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mon sovereign and a single refractory member; but between distinct combinations of the several parts against each other.129

Congress entertained no further proposals of this kind during the Confederation, and none was ever submitted to the states for ratification.
B. The Constitutional Convention
Although the Constitutional Convention considered conferring federal power to coerce states, the idea was quickly put aside. The delegates regarded the introduction of such power to be dangerous to the
Union (because it could cause a civil war) and unjust (because it would
punish innocent citizens along with the guilty). The Convention
avoided the need to authorize coercive power against states by designing a Constitution that conferred legislative power over individuals rather than states, and thus avoided the need for coercive power over
states.
Prior to the Convention, Madison described the lack of coercive
power over states as one of the primary vices of the existing system:
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital
principles of a Political Constitution. Under the form of such a Constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of
alliance, between independent and Sovereign States.130

Madison lamented that because acts of Congress depend “for their execution on the will of the State legislatures,” they are “nominally authoritative, [but] in fact recommendatory only.”131
On April 16, 1787, Madison wrote to George Washington to share
some “outlines of a new system.”132 In addition to proposing federal
power to regulate trade, tax imports and exports, and negative state
laws,133 Madison stated that “the right of coercion should be expressly
declared” and could be exerted “either by sea or land.”134 For the first
time, however, Madison acknowledged the potential dangers of conferring coercive power over states. He observed that “the difficulty &
awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State,
render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be pre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
129 Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. VI (July 4, 1782), reprinted in 3 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 105, at 105; see also DOUGHERTY, supra note 109, at 136 (explaining that
Hamilton’s point was that “the coercive powers amendment might lead to civil war”).
130 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 2
MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 127, at 361, 363.
131 Id. at 364.
132 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 MADISON
WRITINGS, supra note 127, at 344, 344.
133 Id. at 346.
134 Id. at 348.
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cluded.”135 He speculated that “[p]erhaps the negative on the laws [of
the states] might . . . answer this purpose.”136 More importantly, he
suggested that permitting the central government to raise revenue directly by giving it “defined objects of taxation” might avoid the need to
rely on coercive power.137
Notwithstanding these reservations, Madison included power to
regulate and coerce states in the Virginia Plan. As introduced at the
Convention, the Plan provided that “the National Legislature ought to
be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by
the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.”138 In Madison’s view (formed throughout the 1780s), transferring Congress’s existing power to impose affirmative obligations on the
states would necessitate vesting the Legislature with an express power
of coercion. Accordingly, the Virginia Plan proposed that the National
Legislature be empowered “to call forth the force of the Union agst.
any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles
thereof.”139
George Mason immediately objected to such power. According to
Madison, Mason admitted that the present confederation was “deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent
States; but he argued very cogently that punishment could not <in the
nature of things be executed on> the States collectively, and therefore
that such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.”140 These
arguments caused Madison to reconsider his position:
Mr. M<adison>, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it
when applied to people collectively and not individually. — , A Union of
States <containing such an ingredient> seemed to provide for its own de-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
Id. (“[O]r perhaps some defined objects of taxation might be submitted along with commerce, to the general authority.”).
138 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
139 Id. Charles Pinckney also initially endorsed coercive power over states. See Charles
Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government submitted to the Federal Convention, in Philadelphia (May 28, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 106, 119. Pinckney observed that “the present Confederation” lacked such power, and warned that “[u]nless this power
of coercion is infused, and exercised when necessary, the States will most assuredly neglect their
duties.” Id.
140 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 33, 34 (triangular brackets in original).
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struction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by
which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed
as might render this recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be
postponed.141

The Convention granted the postponement and proceeded to consider abandoning the Articles of Confederation in favor of an entirely
new system. As Mason explained: “Under the existing Confederacy,
Congs. represent the States not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals. The case will be changed in
the new plan of Govt.”142 Based on this early exchange, the Convention assumed that the “national government had to be reconstituted
with power to enact, execute, and adjudicate its own laws, acting directly on the American people, without having to rely on the cooperation of the states.”143 Giving Congress legislative power over individuals rather than states eliminated the need to give the new government
power to coerce states.144
On June 15, 1787, William Paterson proposed the New Jersey Plan
as a complete alternative to the Virginia Plan.145 Paterson’s Plan
sought only to “revise[], correct[] & enlarge[]” the Articles of Confederation rather than to discard them for an entirely new system.146 In addition to giving Congress more power, the New Jersey Plan expressly
empowered the federal executive to enforce the Articles against states
by military force.147 In the Committee of the Whole, Paterson argued
that abandoning the Articles of Confederation went beyond “the pow–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
141 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 47, 54 (triangular brackets in original) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
142 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 132, 133; see also Robert Yates, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 140, 141 (“Mr. Mason observed that the national legislature, as to one branch, ought to be elected by the people; because
the objects of their legislation will not be on states, but on individual persons”).
143 RAKOVE, supra note 123, at 53.
144 Madison also believed that congressional power to negative state law would render coercion
unnecessary. See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 164, 164. He was now convinced that coercion was
simply not possible: “Any Govt. for the U. States formed on the supposed practicability of using
force agst. the <unconstitutional proceedings> of the States, wd. prove as visionary & fallacious as
the Govt. of Congs. [under the Articles of Confederation].” Id. at 165 (triangular brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
145 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 242, 242–45.
146 Id. at 242.
147 Id. at 245.
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ers of the Convention,”148 and that drawing representatives “immediately from the States, not from the people” was necessary to maintain “the sovereignty of the States.”149 Edmund Randolph responded
by defending the Virginia Plan and by painting “in strong colours, the
imbecility of the existing confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform”:150
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the
end of a Genl. Govt. can be attained: the 1st. is by coercion as proposed
by Mr. Ps. plan. 2. by real legislation as propd. by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It
tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in
the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for
the service of Ambition. We must resort therefore to a national Legislation over individuals, for which [the existing] Congs. are unfit.151

The introduction of the New Jersey Plan presented the Convention
with a stark choice: retain and amend the Articles of Confederation
(by authorizing coercive power over states) or abandon them in favor
of an entirely new system (that would coerce individuals rather than
states). At the next session, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that
the Virginia Plan “departs itself from the federal idea, as understood by
some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals.”152 Nonetheless,
he agreed with Randolph “that we owed it to our Country, to do on
this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness.”153
Hamilton distinguished between “coertion of laws” and “coertion of
arms,”154 and denied that force could ever be used against states: “But
how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also
will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.”155
Now firmly opposed to coercive power, Madison offered a similar
critique. He asked the smaller states most attached to the New Jersey
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
148 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 249, 250.
149 Id. at 251.
150 Id. at 255.
151 Id. at 255–56.
152 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 282, 283.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 284.
155 Id. at 285; see also id. (“[The Amphyctionic Council] had in particular the power of fining
and using force agst. delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere
signals of war.”).

2010]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1847

Plan “to consider the situation in which it would leave them.”156 Madison explained: “The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will
be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.”157 After
Madison spoke, the Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan (and
coercive power) and re-reported the Virginia Plan (without coercive
power).158
Dissatisfied with this result, John Lansing urged adherence to “the
foundation of the present Confederacy”159 by vesting “the powers of
Legislation . . . <in the U. States> in Congress.”160 Mason responded
by expanding upon his original objections to coercive power:
It was acknowledged by (Mr. Patterson) that his plan could not be enforced without military coertion. Does he consider the force of this concession. The most jarring elements of nature; fire & water themselves are
not more incompatible tha[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and military
execution. Will the militia march from one State to another, in order to
collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic?
Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the citizens of the
invaded State assist one another till they rise as one Man, and shake off
the Union altogether. . . . In one point of view he was struck with horror
at the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the non-payment
of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by de[s]potism itself:
yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty.161

Following Mason’s impassioned speech, the Convention rejected Lansing’s proposal.162
With the Convention firmly against any plan that would introduce
coercive power against states, the debate turned to one of the most
contentious issues of the Convention: the basis for representation in
the Senate. Some delegates thought this issue should be determined in
accordance with the Convention’s decision to replace Congress’s existing power over states with novel power over individuals. The states
had equal representation in Congress under the Articles, and the Articles acted only on states. Delegates like James Madison now argued
that because the proposed Constitution would give Congress legislative
power over individuals rather than states, Congress should be appor–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 313, 319.
157 Id. at 320.
158 Id. at 322.
159 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 20, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 335, 336.
160 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
161 Id. at 339–40 (footnote omitted).
162 Id. at 344.
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tioned by population. In the end, the delegates compromised by
adopting proportional representation in the House and giving states
equal suffrage in the Senate.163
Not surprisingly, delegates from large states favored proportional
representation in the Senate, while small state delegates favored equal
suffrage. In the course of a protracted and heated debate, a few delegates suggested that equal suffrage was appropriate because the government would sometimes act on states. For example, William Davie
remarked that “We were partly federal, partly national in our Union.
And he did not see why the Govt. might (not) in some respects operate
on the States, in others on the people.”164 Madison denied that the
“Governt. would (in its operation) be partly federal, partly national.”165
If true, the observation would favor the following compromise:
In all cases where the Genl. Governt. is to act on the people, let the people
be represented and the votes be proportional. In all cases where the
Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congs. now act
on them, let the States be represented & the votes be equal.166

Madison, however, denied the premise underlying such a compromise.
“He called for a single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not to
operate on the people individually.”167 In addition, he stressed that
“[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the
States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”168
The Convention ultimately broke the deadlock over representation
in the Senate by appointing a committee to devise a compromise.169
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
163 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421 (2008).
164 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 481, 488.
165 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 2, 8.
166 Id. at 8–9.
167 Id. at 9. Only Roger Sherman responded by stating his expectation “that the Genl. Legislature would in some cases act on the federal principle, of requiring quotas.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in
original). Even Sherman did not contemplate coercive enforcement, but merely proposed that the
general legislature “ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into execution, if the States
should fail to supply their respective quotas.” Id.
168 Id. at 9. During ratification, Madison acknowledged that there are “some instances” in
which “the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 250. The example he gave in The
Federalist No. 39, however, suggests that “Madison was not referring to the federal government’s
legislative powers,” Nelson, supra note 91, at 1644 n.363, but to controversies between states (such
as boundary disputes) brought “in their collective and political capacities” in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 245.
Madison thought such jurisdiction “essential to prevent an appeal to the sword,” id. at 246, and
thus distinguished suits between states from suits against states by individuals. See infra notes
300–301 and accompanying text.
169 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 510, 510.
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After resolving this issue, the Convention rejected congressional power
to negative state laws.170 In its place, the Convention adopted the Supremacy Clause, which obligated courts to recognize federal laws and
treaties as “supreme law” notwithstanding contrary state law.171 Unlike the original Virginia Plan, the plan that emerged from the Committee of Detail did not transfer and expand “the Legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.”172 Rather, it gave the “Legislature of the United States” novel powers to act directly on individuals.173 Thus, in place of the power to requisition funds from states, the
plan gave Congress “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises.”174 The remainder of the proposed powers closely tracked
those ultimately granted by Article I, Section 8. Absent from this
enumeration was any legislative power to regulate states or any
power to use force against states to coerce their compliance with feder-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 25, 28.
171 Id. at 28–29.
172 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 17, 21. The Committee consisted of Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel
Gorham, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James Wilson.
173 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 177, 181.
174 Id. (emphasis added). Given the Founders’ rejection of coercive power, it seems safe to assume that they understood the federal taxing power — like all federal legislative powers — to operate on individuals rather than states. Some Founders nonetheless raised concerns regarding
Congress’s ability to collect direct taxes, as opposed to duties, imposts, and excises. The Constitution requires “direct Taxes” to “be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their
respective Numbers.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. By contrast, the Constitution provides that
“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 1. Elbridge Gerry initially objected that the principle of direct taxation “could not be
carried into execution as the States were not to be taxed as States.” See James Madison, Notes on
the Constitutional Convention (July 12, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at
591, 597. Oliver Ellsworth replied that “[t]he sum allotted to a State may be levied without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in raising its own supplies.” Id. Luther Martin later
proposed requiring Congress to proceed initially by requisitions whenever it sought to raise revenue by direct taxes. See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 21, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 355, 359. Martin did not, however, propose giving Congress power to coerce delinquent states. Rather, he proposed that if states failed to comply with requisitions, “then and then only” could Congress bypass the states and “devise and pass
acts directing the mode, and authorizing the collection of the same.” Id. The Convention rejected
Martin’s proposal without debate by a vote of 8 to 1. Id. During ratification, Antifederalists
raised objections to direct taxes, and Madison sought to reassure them by suggesting that whenever Congress imposed such taxes, it would probably give states the option “to supply their quotas
by previous collections of their own” before proceeding to collect the tax directly. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 292. In practice, Congress rarely imposed direct taxes (because of the difficulty of apportionment) and relied almost exclusively on
duties, imposts, and excises to raise federal revenue until the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and the introduction of the income tax.
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al commands.175 As Madison had hoped, the fundamental decision to
give Congress legislative power over individuals rather than states
had rendered the introduction of coercive power against states
unnecessary.176
The Constitution does, of course, contain several important prohibitions both on the United States177 and on the states.178 For example,
the Committee of Detail proposed that “No state shall coin money; nor
grant letters of marque and reprisals; nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of Nobility.”179 The Convention added several more restrictions, including prohibitions on issuing bills of credit, making anything but gold and silver a tender in
payment of debts, and impairing the obligations of contracts. These
various restrictions eventually became Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution.
If these prohibitions could be enforced only through coercive suits
against states, then Article I, Section 10 would contradict Madison’s
repeated assertions that the Constitution neither conferred nor required coercive power over states. This apparent contradiction disappears, however, if these prohibitions could be effectively enforced either by suits between individuals (including suits against state officers)
or through the assertion of federal defenses in suits initiated by states.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
175 Although Randolph did not sign the Constitution, he agreed with the fundamental decision
to replace regulation of states with regulation of individuals: “But although coercion is an indispensable ingredient, it ought not to be directed against a state, as a state; it being impossible to
attempt it except by blockading the trade of the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. . . .
Let us rather substitute the same process, by which individuals are compelled to contribute to the
government of their own states. Instead of making requisitions to the [state] legislatures, it would
appear more proper, that taxes should be imposed by the fœderal head [on the citizens themselves].” Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (1787), in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 260, 266 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) [hereinafter 8 DHRC].
176 The Convention did expressly authorize the use of coercive federal power within — rather
than against — states in order to subdue a rebellion. This extraordinary power, however, was
conditioned “on Application of the [State] Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened).” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Given the Founders’ desire to avoid a civil war,
it is not surprising that the Constitution contains no express authorization for the federal government to use coercive force against states. Even the Guaranty Clause, which appears in the same
section of the Constitution, does not expressly authorize the use of coercive force, although such
power might be implied in this narrow context. See id. (“The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). To be sure, the Constitution
authorizes Congress “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Given the Founders’ desire to avoid civil war, however, this power
was almost certainly limited to enforcing federal statutes against individuals (as opposed to
states).
177 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
178 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
179 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 439 n.14.

2010]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1851

The Founders were familiar with these mechanisms, and reliance on
such indirect means of enforcement was consistent with background
notions of sovereign immunity and the Founders’ decision to avoid reliance on federal power to coerce states.
Thus, contrary to modern assumptions, the Founders did not necessarily assume that an individual could sue a state in federal court to
enforce constitutional prohibitions against states. Rather, they may
well have assumed that such prohibitions would be enforced in the
same way as Article I, Section 9’s similar prohibitions on the United
States — in suits against individuals (including government officials)
or as a defense in suits brought by the government.180 For example, if
Congress enacted a “Tax or Duty . . . on Articles exported from any
State,”181 the Founders would not have necessarily assumed that individuals could sue the United States directly. Rather, they may have
assumed that an individual could challenge the tax either by suing the
collector in his individual capacity, or by refusing to pay the tax and
invoking the Constitution as a defense in any enforcement action.182
Similarly, if a state made paper money a legal tender in violation of
Article I, Section 10, individuals could have enforced their rights without resort to suits against states. In particular, a creditor presumably
could have refused the tender and sued the debtor to recover the debt.
If the debtor invoked the (unconstitutional) state law as a defense, the
creditor could prevail by invoking the Constitution. The Supremacy
Clause obligated state judges to disregard state law in such cases, and
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction allowed it to enforce the
supremacy of federal law. This method avoided federal enforcement of
constitutional prohibitions directly against states. Whatever one
thinks of these enforcement methods today, Federalists maintained
throughout ratification that the Constitution could be enforced without
permitting individuals to sue states and, even more emphatically,
without giving the federal government coercive power over states.
The Committee of Detail, however, did produce at least one proposal that threatened to undermine the Federalists’ core argument for
preferring the Constitution to the Articles of Confederation. In what
would become part of Article III, the Committee proposed that the
federal judicial power extend to controversies “between a State and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
180 See infra notes 497–528 and accompanying text. Although there is no direct evidence of
how the Founders expected Article I, Section 10 to be enforced, it suffices for present purposes to
observe that these restrictions could be enforced in ordinary common law actions between individuals. The availability of such suits might explain why — despite Article I, Section 10 — the
Founders continued to state publicly that the proposed Constitution could be enforced against
individuals rather than states. See infra section III.C, pp. 1853–62.
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
182 See infra section V.B, pp. 1899-1911.
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Citizens of another State,” and “between a State . . . and foreign . . .
citizens or subjects.”183 This language was adopted relatively late in
the Convention without objection or discussion.184 Madison later remarked that this part of the Constitution might have been “better expressed,”185 but at the time the ambiguity apparently went unnoticed.
During the ratification debates, Antifederalists charged that the citizen-state diversity provisions of Article III expressly authorized individuals to sue states in federal court and necessarily implied federal
power to coerce state compliance with any resulting judgments. These
suggestions contradicted the Federalists’ principal argument for abandoning the Articles in favor of the Constitution. To quiet fears about
suits against states and maintain the integrity of their case for the
Constitution, leading Federalists (including Hamilton, Madison, and
Marshall) denied the Antifederalists’ construction of Article III, and
argued that it should be construed to extend federal judicial power only to suits in which a state was the plaintiff.186
Following the Convention, Madison forwarded the proposed Constitution to Thomas Jefferson. Madison went out of his way to explain
that the Constitution empowered Congress to regulate individuals rather than states, and thus did not authorize coercive power against
states:
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured
by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign
States. A voluntary observance of the federal law by all the members
could never be hoped for. A compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent
& the guilty, the necessity of a military force both obnoxious & dangerous,
and in general a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration of a regular Government.
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which instead
of operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on
the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the principle
and proportion of representation.187

Madison’s thinking had fundamentally changed over the course of
the Convention. He arrived in Philadelphia favoring legislative power
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 176, 186.
184 See Journal of the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 138, at 422, 423–25, 434–35.
185 James Madison, Debate Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1387, 1409
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DHRC].
186 See infra notes 256–279 and accompanying text.
187 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 131, 131–32.
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over states and the introduction of coercive power to ensure their
compliance with federal commands. He left the Convention in favor
of a central government with legislative power over individuals rather
than states, and opposed to coercive power over states. In the end, he
regarded the Constitution’s novel approach as the only viable plan of
government. Prominent Federalists in the state ratifying conventions
shared his view. They defended the Constitution’s novel approach,
and denounced as dangerous and unworkable any plan that would introduce coercive force against states.188
C. The Ratification Debates
A threshold issue during ratification was whether the Articles of
Confederation could be salvaged or whether an entirely new system
was needed. Some Antifederalists argued that the Articles could be
repaired and that a new Constitution was unnecessary. Federalists
generally responded by arguing that the Articles could not be retained
without authorizing coercive force against states, and that this approach would lead to civil war. The Constitution, they explained, authorized Congress to impose obligations on individuals rather than
states, and therefore relied solely on enforcement against individuals.
Antifederalists had no response and eventually accepted the need to
abandon the Articles; however, because the Constitution conferred legislative power over individuals, they now demanded a Bill of Rights.
The important point for our purposes is that both Federalists and Antifederalists understood the choice between amending the Articles and
adopting the Constitution to be a choice between legislative power
over states (enforced against states) and legislative power over individuals (enforced against individuals). Like the delegates at Philadelphia before them, the ratifiers came to regard the Constitution as the
only viable option.
Just three weeks after the Constitutional Convention, Alexander
Hamilton began writing the Federalist Papers.189 Hamilton enlisted
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
188 Professor Carlos Vázquez was the first modern commentator to recognize the link between
state sovereign immunity and the Founders’ decision to reject “the notion of enforcing federal obligations against the states as collective political bodies.” Vázquez, supra note 11, at 1781. Vázquez assumed that the Constitution gives Congress power to impose obligations on states, id. at
1782, but concluded that these and other “federal obligations of the states . . . are, as a constitutional matter, to be enforced in suits against the individual state officials who violate federal law”
rather than in suits against states, id. at 1781–82. I agree that the Founders understood the Constitution to withhold coercive power to enforce federal obligations against states, but believe they
also understood the Constitution not to grant Congress legislative power over states.
189 Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 807, 842 (2007). For illuminating
discussions on the role of the Federalist Papers, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the
Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
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John Jay and James Madison to write under the collective name “Publius.”190 Two of these early essays built on Hamilton’s arguments at
the Constitutional Convention, and are important for understanding
the Eleventh Amendment.
In The Federalist No. 15, first published on December 1, 1787,
Hamilton examined “the insufficiency of the present Confederation to
the preservation of the Union.”191 Responding to those who favored
retaining the Confederation, he argued that there were “fundamental
errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of
the fabric.”192 According to Hamilton:
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. . . . Except as to the
rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to
make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise
either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The
consequence of this is that though in theory their resolutions concerning
those objects are laws constitutionally binding on the members of the
Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States
observe or disregard at their option.193

Hamilton explained that this type of compact is “subject to the usual
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and nonobservance, as the
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate.”194 He stressed
that if the United States wished to avoid this “perilous situation,” then
“we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens — the only proper objects of government.”195
Hamilton maintained that a shift from legislation for states (under
the Articles) to legislation for individuals (under the Constitution) was
necessary in order to enforce federal law and avoid civil war. As he
explained, “the idea of a law” requires that there be “a penalty or punishment for disobedience.”196 This penalty “can only be inflicted in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
REV. 1301 (1998); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998).
190 Maggs, supra note 189, at 811. The first seventeen essays were published before any state
had ratified the Constitution. Id. at 826 tbl.2. Many essays were republished in other states. In
addition, the first thirty-six essays were reprinted as a book during ratification. Id. at 812–13,
826. The remaining essays were later published in a second volume. Id. at 812–13.
191 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 105 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
192 Id. at 108.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 109.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 110.
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two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by
military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the
COERCION of arms.”197 “The first kind,” Hamilton explained, “can
evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States.”198 Thus, in a
confederation (exercising legislative power over its constituent states),
“every breach of the laws must involve a state of war.”199
In The Federalist No. 16, published on December 4, 1787, Hamilton posed a stark choice between retaining the Articles of Confederation (and introducing coercive force against states) or adopting a new
Constitution (and avoiding coercive force). In his view, coercive force
against states was impracticable and likely to cause the “violent death
of the Confederacy.”200 On the first point, he observed:
Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States
singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become
even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to
operate upon them in their collective capacities and to be executed by a
coercion applicable to them in the same capacities.201

Even if coercive force were practicable, Hamilton thought it was too
dangerous to confer: “When the sword is once drawn, the passions of
men observe no bounds of moderation. . . . The first war of this kind
would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.”202
To avoid these difficulties, Hamilton thought that the federal government “must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care,
upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the
proposed Constitution. It must carry the agency to the persons of the
citizens.”203 By imposing obligations on individuals rather than states,
the federal government could “employ the arm of the ordinary
magistrate to execute its own resolutions.”204 In other words, regulating individuals and enforcing such regulations through “the courts of
justice”205 would avoid the need either to rely on the “exceptionable
principle” of “legislation for States”206 or to enforce such legislation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id.
Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 113. Hamilton responded to the potential objection that a state “disaffected to the
authority of the Union . . . could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.” Id.
at 116. He stressed “the essential difference between a mere NONCOMPLIANCE and a DIRECT

1856

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1817

by military coercion.
In Hamilton’s view, these considerations
prevented revision of the Articles and necessitated adoption of the
Constitution.207
Hamilton’s arguments against the Articles of Confederation and in
favor of the Constitution were repeated in state ratifying conventions,
usually by Federalists who — like Hamilton — had attended the Constitutional Convention. For example, in Connecticut, William Samuel
Johnson explained why the Convention abandoned the Articles in favor of an entirely new system:
The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legislate for states
in their political capacity; that the coercion of law can be exercised by
nothing but a military force. They have therefore gone upon entirely new
ground. They have formed one new nation out of the individual states.
The Constitution vests in the general legislature a power to make laws in
matters of national concern, to appoint judges to decide upon these laws,
and to appoint officers to carry them into execution. This excludes the
idea of an armed force. The power which is to enforce these laws is to be
a legal power vested in proper magistrates. The force which is to be employed is the energy of law; and this force is to operate only upon individuals who fail in their duty to their country.208

In response to renewed Antifederalist objections, Oliver Ellsworth
reiterated the necessity of enforcing congressional commands against
individuals rather than states:
Hence we see, how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No
man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel this necessity. The only
question is, shall it be a coercion of law or a coercion of arms? There is
no other possible alternative. Where will those who oppose a coercion of
law come out? Where will they end? A necessary consequence of their
principles is a war of the states, one against the other. I am for coercion
by law, that coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
and ACTIVE RESISTANCE.” Id. If affirmative state action is necessary to give effect to a federal
measure, then states “have only NOT TO ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated.” Id. Federal officials would be reluctant to use force in such cases because this “neglect of
duty may be disguised.” Id. If, by contrast, the laws of the national government “were to pass
into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power.” Id.
at 117.
207 Hamilton reiterated these themes in later essays. In The Federalist No. 20, he stressed that
“a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, . . . is subversive of the
order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of the mild and salutary coercion
of the magistracy.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 138. Similarly, in The Federalist No. 23, he wrote “that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy
and duration we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective
capacities.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 154.
208 The Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 541, 546 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3
DHRC].
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Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states in their
political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an
armed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by
sending an armed force against a delinquent state, it would involve the
good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.209

Members of the Massachusetts ratifying convention also stressed
the Constitution’s grant of legislative power over individuals rather
than states as its primary advantage over the Articles.210 Rufus King
explained that “[l]aws to be effective . . . must not be laid on states, but
upon individuals.”211 Similarly, Samuel Stillman observed that the
“absolute deficiency of the articles of Confederation, is allowed by
all.”212 In support, he quoted Randolph’s public assessment that “the
powers, by which alone the blessings of a general government can be
accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the Confederation, without a
change of its very essence; or in other words, that that Confederation
must be thrown aside.”213
During the debate in the South Carolina House of Representatives
over whether to call a ratifying convention, Charles Pinckney — who
had attended the Constitutional Convention — explained “that the
states [at the Convention] were unanimous in preferring a change”
from the Articles of Confederation.214 The reason for this preference
was that the delegates understood that the Confederation was “nothing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
209 Id. at 553–54. Samuel Holden Parsons similarly explained that consent to be governed
“would be of little avail unless a coercive power to compel obedience was not also granted.” Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 208,
at 569, 572. In his view, however, “it must appear much more eligible to carry home the punishment of the offense to the person of the transgressor by legal decrees, than to exercise the power of
the sword against states and communities and involve the innocent and guilty in one indiscriminate scene of distress.” Id.
210 Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 21, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1282, 1285 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 2000) [hereinafter 6 DHRC].
211 Id. at 1287. Several delegates discussed the advantages of the Constitution over the Articles
in terms of raising revenue. For example, Thomas Dawes observed that “surely a whole state, a
whole community, can be compelled only by an army; but taxes upon an individual, implies only
the use of a collector of taxes.” Id. at 1289. Similarly, Christopher Gore argued that “it is not only
safe, but indispensibly necessary to our peace and dignity” to vest the proposed government with
authority to lay and collect taxes. Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 22, 1788), reprinted in
6 DHRC, supra note 210, at 1297, 1300. The alternative was unacceptable because “collections
from states are at all times slow and uncertain — and in case of refusal, the non-complying state
must be coerced by arms, which in its consequences would involve the innocent with the guilty,
and introduce all the horrours of a civil war.” Id. at 1301. See also Massachusetts Convention
Debates (Jan. 23, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 210, at 1312, 1317–19 (remarks of James Bowdoin).
212 Massachusetts Convention Debates (Feb. 6, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 210, at 1454,
1455.
213 Id. (quoting Letter of Edmund Randolph to Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates
(Oct. 10, 1787), in AM. HERALD, Jan. 21, 1787).
214 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 255.
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more than a federal Union . . . where the members might, or might
not, comply with their federal engagements, as they thought proper.”215
According to Pinckney, “the necessity of having a government which
should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states, was
conceived to be indispensible by every delegation present.”216
At the Virginia ratifying convention, Francis Corbin recounted the
defects of the Articles of Confederation, especially the inability to raise
money, and saw only two alternatives: either adopt the Constitution
and permit direct taxation of individuals or amend the Articles of Confederation and vest Congress with a superintending coercive power
over the states. Referring to coercive force, Corbin said:
Is this cruel mode of compulsion eligible? Is it consistent with the spirit of
republicanism? This savage mode, which could be made use of under the
confederation, leads directly to civil war and destruction. How different is
this from the genius of the proposed Constitution? By this proposed plan,
the public money is to be collected by mild and gentle means; by a peaceable and friendly application to the individuals of the community.
Whereas by the other scheme, the public treasury must be supplied
through the medium of the sword — by desolation and murder — by the
blood of the citizens.217

In his view, amending the Articles was not an option.218 Edmund
Randolph agreed. “If an army be . . . once marched into Virginia,” he
asserted, “[t]he most lamentable civil war must ensue.”219
James Madison also spoke in the Virginia convention against coercive power over states. In place of requisitions, he favored giving “the
General Government, the power of laying and collecting taxes.”220 He
characterized this power as “indispensible and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well organized system of Government.”221
John Marshall agreed. “By direct taxation, the necessities of the Gov–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
215
216

Id.
Id. at 256. The South Carolina House called a ratifying convention, which met on May 12,
1788, and ratified the Constitution on May 23, 1788.
217 Francis Corbin, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1007, 1009 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter 9 DHRC].
218 Id. at 1010 (“Our state-vessel has sprung a-leak — We must embark in a new bottom, or
sink into perdition.”).
219 Id. at 1018. Antifederalist George Mason stated that the “power of laying direct taxes, does
of itself, entirely change the confederation of the States into one consolidated Government.”
George Mason, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra
note 217, at 936, 936. Patrick Henry stated that if the Constitution had used the phrase “we the
States” rather than the phrase, “We, the people,” then “this would be a confederation: It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government.” Patrick Henry, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 217, at 951, 951.
220 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC,
supra note 217, at 1028, 1028.
221 Id.
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ernment will be supplied in a peaceable manner without irritating the
minds of the people.”222 Requisitions, he said, “cannot be rendered efficient without a civil war.”223
In the New York ratifying convention, Robert Livingston opened
the debate by pointing out that, under the Articles, congressional
commands were directed only to states and could not be enforced except by military force. He “deduced from [such] observations that the
old confederation was defective in its principle, and impeachable in its
execution, as it operated upon States in their political capacity, and
not upon individuals; and that it carried with it the seeds of
domestic violence, and tended ultimately to its own dissolution.”224 He
concluded that “we were driven to the necessity of creating a new
constitution.”225
After Antifederalist Melancton Smith warned against adopting a
new form of government,226 Alexander Hamilton lamented “that there
is still some lurking favorite imagination, that this system, with corrections, might become a safe and permanent one.”227 Hamilton stressed
that “the radical vice in the old confederation is, that the laws of the
Union apply only to States in their corporate capacity.”228 He reminded the convention how ineffective requisitions had been in 1780
when New York was “weak, distressed and forlorn” from “the ravages
of war.”229 Hamilton argued that there was no effective way to remedy the want of vigor in the Confederation:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
222 John Marshall, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 DHRC,
supra note 217, at 1115, 1121.
223 Id. Some delegates, like Patrick Henry, continued to defend requisitions, but George Nicholas responded that “[t]hey are fruitless without the coercion of arms,” which he considered “a
dreadful alternative.” George Nicholas, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10,
1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1127, 1133. William Grayson offered a last-ditch defense of
the Confederation by arguing that it was more honorable to coerce states than individuals. He
admitted that “coercion is necessary in every Government in some degree, [and] that it is manifestly wanting in our present Government.” William Grayson, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention (June 11, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1164, 1169. In his view, however,
adopting the Constitution would not avoid coercion, but merely introduce coercion of a different
kind. “The difference is this, that by this Constitution the sword is employed against individuals,
by the other it is employed against the States, which is more honorable.” Id.
224 Robert R. Livingston, Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention (June 19, 1788), in 22
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1682, 1686
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2008) [hereinafter 22 DHRC].
225 Id. at 1687. Livingston later clarified that he was contending “that the laws of the general
legislature must act, and be enforced upon individuals.” Robert R. Livingston, Speech in the New
York Ratifying Convention (June 23, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 224, at 1809, 1809.
226 Melancton Smith, Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 22
DHRC, supra note 224, at 1712, 1712–13.
227 Alexander Hamilton, Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 22
DHRC, supra note 224, at 1722, 1723.
228 Id.
229 Id.
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If you make requisitions and they are not complied with, what is to be
done? It has been well observed, that to coerce the States is one of the
maddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance will
never be confined to a single State: This being the case, can we suppose it
wise to hazard a civil war? . . . Every such war must involve the innocent
with the guilty — This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose
every peaceable citizen against such a government.
What, Sir, is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the
states do.230

Hamilton concluded that these considerations foreclosed taking “the
Old Confederation, as the basis of a new system.”231 Instead, “a government totally different must be instituted,” and we “must totally
eradicate and discard [the fundamental principle of the Old Confederation] before we can expect an efficient government.”232
The next day, Smith responded by conceding Hamilton’s point and
then shifting ground:
He has taken up much time by endeavouring to prove that the great defect in the old confederation was, that it operated upon states instead of
individuals. It is needless to dispute concerning points on which we do
not disagree: It is admitted that the powers of the general government
ought to operate upon individuals to a certain degree. How far the powers should extend, and in what cases to individuals is the question.233

By the time North Carolina considered the Constitution, there was
apparent consensus that the Confederation was defective beyond repair. William Davie, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, began by defending the Convention’s decision to abandon
the Articles:
Another radical vice in the old system, which was necessary to be corrected, and which will be understood without a long deduction of reasoning, was, that it legislated on states, instead of individuals; and that its
powers could not be executed but by fire or by the sword — by military
force, and not by the intervention of the civil magistrate. . . . It was therefore absolutely necessary that . . . the laws should be carried home to individuals themselves.234

Davie stressed that “[e]very member [of the Convention] saw that the
existing system would ever be ineffectual, unless its laws operated on
individuals, as military coercion was neither eligible nor practica–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
230
231
232
233

Id. at 1724–25.
Id. at 1725.
Id.
Melancton Smith, Address to New York Convention (June 21, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra
note 224, at 1748, 1748.
234 William Davie, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 42, at 21–22.
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ble.”235 These considerations, he explained, convinced “the Convention to depart from that solecism in politics — the principle of legislation for states in their political capacities.”236
James Iredell — a former delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a future Supreme Court Justice — stressed the impossibility
of enforcing requisitions against states:
Suppose . . . Congress had proceeded to enforce their requisitions, by sending an army to collect them; what would have been the consequence?
Civil war, in which the innocent must have suffered with the guilty.
Those who were willing to pay would have been equally distressed with
those who were unwilling. Requisitions thus having failed of their purpose, it is proposed, by this Constitution, that, instead of collecting taxes
by the sword, application shall be made by the government to the individual citizens. If any individual disobeys, the courts of justice can give immediate relief. This is the only natural and effective method of enforcing
laws.237

These arguments ultimately persuaded Antifederalists to embrace the
idea that “the government was not to operate against states, but
against individuals.”238
This recognition led some Antifederalists to shift ground and stress
the need for a Bill of Rights.239 For example, Samuel Spencer highlighted the fact that the government was proposed for individuals:
The very caption of the Constitution shows that this is the case. The expression, “We, the people of the United States,” shows that this government is intended for individuals; there ought, therefore, to be a bill of
rights. I am ready to acknowledge that the Congress ought to have the
power of executing its laws. Heretofore, because all the laws of the Confederation were binding on the states in their political capacities, courts
had nothing to do with them; but now the thing is entirely different. The
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Id. at 22.
Id. Antifederalists accepted the premise that the new system would enforce legislation
against individuals rather than states. For example, Samuel Spencer acknowledged that requisitions could not be enforced through military force, but proposed that Congress be empowered to
tax individuals only “if the states fail to pay those taxes in a convenient time.” Samuel Spencer,
Address to North Carolina Convention (July 26, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42,
at 76. Federalists responded that Spencer’s “expedient of applying to the states in the first instance will be productive of delay, and will certainly terminate in a disappointment to Congress.”
Richard Spaight, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 26, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’ S
DEBATES, supra note 42, at 82.
237 James Iredell, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’ S
DEBATES, supra note 42, at 146.
238 Samuel Spencer, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’ S
DEBATES, supra note 42, at 163.
239 For Spencer, the goal of this Bill of Rights was “securing the great rights of the states and
people.” Id.
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laws of Congress will be binding on individuals, and those things which
concern individuals will be brought properly before the courts.240

Antifederalists and Federalists now agreed that this shift in the nature
of the Union was necessary because “laws could not be put in execution against states without the agency of the sword, which, instead of
answering the ends of government, would destroy it.”241
D. Article III and State Suability
Once Antifederalists agreed that the Articles of Confederation were
flawed beyond repair, they began to scrutinize the new plan. They
identified two provisions that seemed to undercut the Federalists’ case
for the Constitution. Article III expressly extended the judicial power
to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State” and
“between a State . . . and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects.”242 These
provisions, of course, have been central in the debates about the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity, but are properly understood as part of the broader debate over the nature of the Union.
Although the Constitutional Convention approved these provisions
without debate, Antifederalists became concerned that courts would
construe them as express authorization for individuals to sue states in
federal court. This construction would suggest that the federal government had implied power to coerce states to comply with any resulting judgments.
Prominent Federalists — such as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall — responded that Article III should not be
construed to authorize suits against states. Rather, they maintained
that it should be construed narrowly to extend only to suits in which a
state was the plaintiff. Modern commentators tend to view these
comments as puzzling or even disingenuous. In fact, this reading of
Article III — whatever its intrinsic merit — necessarily followed from
the Federalists’ understanding that the proposed Constitution did not
empower the federal government to coerce state compliance with federal commands. From their perspective, any attempt to coerce state
compliance with judicial decrees under the Constitution would have
been just as likely to provoke a civil war as an attempt to coerce state
compliance with congressional requisitions under the Articles of Confederation. Thus, Federalists argued quite sincerely that Article III
should not be construed to bring about “such a consequence.”243
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
240 Id. at 153; see also id. at 163 (arguing that because the Constitution would act on individuals, “the rights of individuals ought to be properly secured”).
241 Id. at 163.
242 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
243 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488.
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It is also worth noting that Antifederalists raised no similar objections to Article III’s federal question jurisdiction. Unlike the statecitizen diversity provisions, this portion of Article III made no express
reference to suits against states. In addition, suits by individuals
against states were not necessary to enforce the proposed Constitution,
especially since the Founders did not understand the document to confer either legislative or coercive power over states. Although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from silence, there are several indications
that neither Federalists nor Antifederalists understood federal question
jurisdiction to authorize individuals to sue states in federal court.
During the ratification debates, two individuals mistakenly suggested
that Article III would permit suits against states by their own citizens.
When these suggestions were challenged, no one raised federal question jurisdiction — or any other provision of Article III — as a basis
for such suits. Rather, those who considered the question concluded
that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant this construction.”244 The state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III drew
the attention of both Antifederalists and Federalists because they were
the only provisions that the Founders thought might be construed as
expressly authorizing individuals to sue states.
1. State-Citizen Diversity Jurisdiction. — Some background is
necessary to understand the problem posed by the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III. The original thirteen states were deeply in
debt when they met in 1787 to draft a new Constitution. To fund the
Revolutionary War, they had borrowed over $200 million.245 Much of
this debt was no longer in the hands of the original purchasers, having
been sold at steep discounts to out-of-state speculators.246 Honoring
this debt would have imposed enormous burdens on state taxpayers
and threatened some states with financial ruin. Prior to the Constitution’s adoption, states were immune from suit without their consent
and thus free to repay their debts in whatever manner they saw fit.247
Article III raised concerns during ratification because it arguably authorized out-of-state creditors to sue states in federal court.
Soon after the Constitution was proposed, the Federal Farmer objected to the state-citizen clauses of Article III:
How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen of another
state to bring actions against state governments, which have failed in per-
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Aristides, Letter, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, April 1, 1788.
See Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY 128, 130 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
246 See id. at 131.
247 Some states consented to suit in their own courts; others did not. See Nelson, supra note 91,
at 1574–79.
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forming so many promises made during the war, is doubtful: How far it
may be proper so to humble a state, as to bring it to answer to an individual in a court of law, is worthy of consideration; the states are now subject
to no such actions, and this new jurisdiction will subject the states, and
many defendants to actions, and processes, which were not in the contemplation of the parties, when the contract was made; all engagements existing between . . . states and citizens of other states were made the parties
contemplating the remedies then existing on the laws of the states — and
the new remedy proposed to be given in the federal courts, can be founded
on no principle whatever.248

In Article III, Antifederalists had found an issue of concern to the citizens of every state. If out-of-state creditors could sue states to recover
their debts, taxpayers would have to pay enormous sums, often to outof-state speculators. In addition, enforcement of any resulting judgments would require the federal government to use coercive force
against states.
Brutus objected to the state-citizen provisions of Article III in just
these terms. He thought that such jurisdiction was “improper in itself,
and will, in its exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive. It is
improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the
suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government . . . .”249 Brutus also thought that federal enforcement of judgments against states would be “pernicious and destructive.” All outstanding debts, he argued, could eventually be recovered under Article
III. Once a state is sued by a citizen of a different state, “the notes of
the state will pass rapidly from the hands of citizens of the state to
those of other states,” meaning that “judgments and executions may
be obtained against the state for the whole amount of the state
debt.”250
Brutus anticipated two important Federalist responses: first, that
the state-citizen provisions of Article III do not clearly authorize suits
against states by individuals; and second, that any judgments rendered
would be impossible to enforce. On the first point, Brutus stated that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
248 Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 30, 41–42 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter 14 DHRC].
249 Brutus, Letter XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 795, 796 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2004) [hereinafter 20 DHRC]. Brutus also thought that the creation of retroactive federal remedies would be unfair because the individuals who purchased state obligations “never had in contemplation any compulsory mode of obliging the government to fulfil its
engagements.” Id. For a summary of the Antifederalist objections to retrospective claims against
states, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1304–13 (1998).
250 Brutus, Letter XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 249, at 795,
796.

2010]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1865

if the judicial power “does not extend to these cases, I confess myself
utterly at a loss to give it any meaning.”251 On the second point, he
argued that if jurisdiction is proper, then Congress will be able to
“provide for levying an execution on a state” pursuant to its necessary
and proper power.252 Thus, “[e]xecution may be levied on any property of the state, either real or personal.”253 He even raised the possibility that “the estate of any individual citizen may . . . be made answerHe
able for the discharge of judgments against the state.”254
concluded that the judicial power, if not altered, “will crush the states
beneath its weight.”255
These objections moved Alexander Hamilton to respond in The
Federalist No. 81.256 He observed that it “has been suggested that an
assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of
another would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal
courts for the amount of those securities.”257 In his view, this suggestion had “excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds,” and was
“without foundation.”258 In Hamilton’s view, Article III did not unambiguously authorize individuals to sue states or empower the federal
government to enforce any resulting judgments against states:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must
be merely ideal. . . . A recurrence to the principles [governing alienation of
state sovereignty] will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the
State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience
of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They
confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will.259
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Id. at 798.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
This essay was first published on May 28, 1788, and was subsequently republished in several newspapers. Maggs, supra note 189, at 813.
257 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 487.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 487–88. Hamilton was apparently relying, in part, on the law of nations. See Nelson,
supra note 91, at 1574 (“Under the general law of nations, sovereigns were thought to enjoy a
broad exemption from command.”).
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For Hamilton, background notions of sovereign immunity meant that
only an express surrender of such immunity would suffice to subject
states to suits by individuals. The Constitution not only lacked such
an express surrender, but it also failed to grant express federal power
to enforce any resulting judgments against states:
To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts
they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it could
not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a
pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which would involve
such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.260

Hamilton’s rejection of both state suability and implied enforcement
power was fully consistent with — if not compelled by — his earlier
assurances in The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16 that the Constitution did
not give the federal government power to enact legislation for states or
coerce them in their collective capacities.261
The debate over Article III was not confined to New York.262 In
Massachusetts, Antifederalists expressed fears that Article III authorized out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court, but were again
assured by Federalists that this construction was wrong. After Chisholm was decided, Antifederalists reminded the public of these assurances. Writing in 1793, Marcus recounted that the power of the federal government “to call into their Courts, a Commonwealth or a State,
to answer to the demand of a foreigner (perhaps a tory) was powerfully
opposed in the Convention of this and other . . . States.”263 According
to Marcus, “[t]his power in the Federal Government, would not have
been consented to by this commonwealth, but for Rufus King[,] Esq.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488.
Some commentators suggest that Hamilton’s disclaimer of state suability in The Federalist
No. 81 is inconsistent with his discussion of federal question jurisdiction in The Federalist No. 80.
See Pfander, supra note 249, at 1306–07. In The Federalist No. 80, however, Hamilton merely
points out that the restrictions on state action found in Article I, Section 10 can be enforced in
suits arising under the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 12, at 479. He does not say that such suits will be against states, and given his unequivocal
rejection of such suits in The Federalist No. 81, it seems more likely that he had in mind suits between individuals (including state officers). See infra notes 497–500 and accompanying text.
262 Commentators have construed James Wilson’s remarks in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention as endorsing state suability. See Gibbons, supra note 63, at 1902–03; Pfander, supra note
249, at 1313 & n.198. Wilson’s remarks, however, are ambiguous in this regard because he does
not clearly specify that a state may be made a defendant without its consent. Referring to jurisdiction over controversies between a state and citizens of another state, Wilson praised the provision for ensuring “[i]mpartiality,” and stated: “When a citizen has a controversy with another
state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing.” 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 491. Professor Fletcher believed that Wilson’s “words are
probably best understood as referring only to the neutrality of the federal forum.” Fletcher, supra
note 6, at 1051.
263 Marcus, MASS. MERCURY, July 13, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC supra note 20, at 389, 389.
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who ‘pledged his honour,’ in the State Convention, ‘that the Convention at Philadelphia never discovered a disposition to infringe on the
Government of an individual State.”264 Marcus reported that “[o]n the
strength of this gentleman’s opinion, the Article in the Constitution
was assented to but by a small majority.”265
William Martin, speaking in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, also recalled such assurances:
He observed it was agreed on most sides of the House, that if the article
did convey the meaning as determined by part of the Judiciary, it was not
the intention of the [Massachusetts] Convention, nor was it understood to
be so construed — nay, there were several gentlemen then present, who
signified their remembrance, that Mr. Sedgwick and Mr. Strong, both in
Convention, and now in the Senate and House of the United States, had
declared their minds to that purpose, and that they disapproved of it, and
would endeavour to bring on the question, and get it altered if possible.266

Given these assurances, it is not surprising that Sedgwick and Strong
took the lead in Congress to secure adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.267
Antifederalists in Virginia raised the same concerns about Article
III as Antifederalists in New York and Massachusetts, and they were
likewise reassured by leading Federalists that the provisions would be
construed narrowly. For example, Antifederalist George Mason objected to the state-citizen diversity provisions, and asked how judgments in such cases could be enforced:
Is this State to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual? — Is the sovereignty of the State to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender? — Will the States undergo this mortification? I think this
power perfectly unnecessary. But let us pursue this subject further. What
is to be done if a judgment be obtained against a State? — Will you issue
a fieri facias? It would be ludicrous to say, that you could put the State’s
body in jail. How is the judgment then to be inforced? A power which
cannot be executed, ought not to be granted.268

James Madison responded to Mason’s objections by candidly acknowledging “that this part [of the Constitution] does not stand in that form,
which would be freest from objection. It might be better ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id.
Id. at 389–90. Referring to Rufus King’s remarks at the state ratifying convention, a Democrat likewise recalled: “A great civilian rose; and, in an harangue, of two hours length, endeavoured to prove that, the article in debate, could not possibly bear the construction put upon it by
gentlemen.” Democrat, MASS. MERCURY, July 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at
393, 393.
266 Account of William Martin’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 434, 434.
267 See infra notes 439–448 and accompanying text.
268 George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note
185, at 1403, 1406 (footnote omitted).
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pressed.”269 He insisted, however, that “a fair and liberal interpretation upon the words” would not authorize the general government “to
commit the oppressions [Mason] dreads.”270
The next day, Madison tried to defuse the objections by construing
Article III to permit suits by — but not against — states:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a State and citizens of another
State, is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the
power of individuals to call any State into Court. The only operation it
can have, is, that if a State should wish to bring suit against a citizen, it
must be brought before the Federal Court. . . . It is a case which cannot
often happen, and if it should be found improper, it will be altered.271

This response did not satisfy Antifederalists like Patrick Henry who
decried the prospect of “incarcerating a State.”272 Henry said that it
would ease his mind “if the Honorable Gentleman would tell me the
manner in which money should be paid, if in a suit between a State
and individuals, the State were cast.”273 Referring to Madison’s earlier
stance against giving Congress coercive power over states, Henry
mockingly remarked that “[t]he Honorable Gentleman perhaps does
not mean to use coercion, but some gentle caution.”274 He next criticized Madison’s narrow reading of the text to mean “that the State
may be the plaintiff only.”275 Henry said that this construction was
“perfectly incomprehensible,”276 and objected that “[i]f Gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language
of the people, there is an end of all argument.”277
John Marshall answered Henry by construing Article III narrowly
in light of background principles of sovereign immunity:
With respect to disputes between a State, and the citizens of another State,
its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope no Gentlemen will think that a State will be called at the bar of the Federal
Court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in
which the Legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the State is not sued?
It is not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a Court. The intent is, to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in other States. I contend this construction is warranted by

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
269 James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra
note 185, at 1409, 1409.
270 Id.
271 James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra
note 185, at 1412, 1414.
272 Patrick Henry, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note
185, at 1419, 1422.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 1423.
276 Id. at 1422.
277 Id. at 1423.
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the words. But, they say, there will be partiality in it if a State cannot be
defendant — if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a
State, though he may be sued by a State. It is necessary to be so, and
cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a State defendant, which
does not prevent its being plaintiff.278

Madison’s and Marshall’s narrow construction of Article III was consistent with their general understanding that the Constitution gave the
federal government neither legislative nor coercive power over
In essence, they agreed with Hamilton that reading
states.279
Article III broadly to authorize suits against states — and therefore
imply coercive power over states — “would be altogether forced and
unwarrantable.”280
Modern commentators sometimes suggest that Federalists like
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall were either “disingenuous” or “dissembling” when they argued that Article III should not be construed to
permit individuals to sue states because these men otherwise favored
enhanced federal powers.281 Whatever one thinks of their construction, their position on state suability is not surprising given their understanding that the Constitution did not authorize the use of coercive
force against states. All three thought that the use of such power
would provoke a civil war, and that the lack of such power in the
Constitution was one of its crucial advantages over proposals to
amend the Articles of Confederation. On the central issues of taxation,
raising armies, and regulating commerce, the Constitution solved pre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
278 John Marshall, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note
185, at 1430, 1433.
279 See supra notes 220–223 and accompanying text. Randolph disagreed with Madison’s and
Marshall’s construction. See Governor Edmund Randolph, Address to the Virginia Convention
(June 21, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1450, 1453 (stating that “any doubt respecting the
construction that a State may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words, where
a State shall be a party”). Based on the surviving record, Randolph was “the only advocate of
ratification publicly to contemplate Article III as authorizing compulsive suits by individuals
against states.” Menashi, supra note 86, at 1175 n.186. Because Article III was at least ambiguous, the Virginia ratifying convention favored a constitutional amendment to remove all of the
diversity provisions of Article III, including the state-citizen diversity clause. See Virginia Ratifying Convention Proposed Amendments to the Constitution (June 27, 1788), reprinted in 10
DHRC, supra note 185, at 1553, 1555. The North Carolina ratifying convention proposed a similar amendment. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 246.
280 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488.
281 See Gibbons, supra note 63, at 1906–08 (suggesting that “Madison was merely dissembling,”
id. at 1906, and concluding that “the Madison-Marshall interpretation of article III was not taken
seriously at the Virginia convention,” id. at 1908); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 47–48 (1988) (characterizing
Madison’s and Marshall’s remarks as a “disingenuous defense of the state-citizen clauses” of Article III); Marshall, supra note 8, at 1371 (referring to “Madison’s probably disingenuous attempt
to convince the Virginia convention that sovereign immunity was not affected by certain portions
of article III”); Massey, supra note 7, at 93 (stating that a “few proponents, such as James Madison, may have dissembled by suggesting that a state could not be sued without its consent”).
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viously intractable enforcement problems by authorizing Congress to
legislate for individuals rather than states. The Antifederalists’ suggestion that the state-citizen provisions of Article III empowered federal courts to hear suits against states reintroduced the specter of coercive power, and thus threatened to undermine a key reason for
adopting the Constitution. From this perspective, Hamilton, Madison,
and Marshall had genuine and compelling reasons for construing these
provisions narrowly.
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction. — One might wonder why Antifederalists did not also object to federal question jurisdiction under Article III on the ground that it could be construed to permit suits
against states by individuals. If — as modern theories of the Eleventh
Amendment assume — federal question jurisdiction authorizes federal
courts to hear suits by citizens against their own states, then one would
have expected Antifederalists at least to have questioned the propriety
of such jurisdiction. In the debates over state-citizen diversity jurisdiction, the Founders generally seem to have assumed that the states
would retain their preexisting immunity unless they expressly surrendered it in the Constitution.282 The fight over the state-citizen provisions of Article III centered on whether they should be construed as an
express surrender. Federalists insisted that an ambiguous surrender
(merely extending judicial power to controversies “between” states and
out-of-state citizens) would not suffice. Antifederalists, on the other
hand, feared (correctly) that judges would construe the relevant language as an express surrender. Unlike the state-citizen diversity provisions, however, federal question jurisdiction contains no reference —
clear or ambiguous — to suits against states. Perhaps for this reason,
there was no real debate during the ratification era over whether federal question jurisdiction could be construed as a surrender of state
sovereign immunity.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Founders would not
have regarded suits against states as a necessary means of enforcing
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. There was a
long tradition among English and early American courts of permitting
aggrieved individuals to sue government officers in tort.283 Officers
could shield themselves from liability by showing that their conduct
was authorized by law, but were left defenseless if the law they in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
282 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488. Professor Kurt
Lash has recently made an analogous argument that the Founders understood Congress to have
only expressly enumerated powers under the original Constitution. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889 (2008).
283 See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14 (1972).

2010]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1871

voked was unconstitutional.284 The Founders may have expected,
therefore, that the Constitution’s original prohibitions on states would
be enforced in suits between individuals or in cases brought by the
state.285 In addition, Federalists and Antifederalists generally agreed
that the Constitution did not give Congress either legislative or coercive power over states. Given these background assumptions, it is not
surprising that Antifederalists did not perceive federal question jurisdiction as a potential waiver of state sovereign immunity. The only
provisions that plausibly could have been read as an express authorization to hear suits by individuals against states were the state-citizen
diversity provisions of Article III.
Indeed, the only direct evidence relating to federal question jurisdiction undermines the modern assumption that the Founders must
have understood such jurisdiction to permit in-state citizens to be able
to sue their own states. That evidence arose from two inadvertent
mistakes. Writing as “Aristides,” Alexander Contee Hanson — a Federalist delegate to the Maryland ratifying convention — published a
pamphlet on January 31, 1788 defending the proposed Constitution.
In describing the judicial power, Hanson stated that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to “Cases between a state, and
its own citizens.”286 Tench Coxe, a prominent Pennsylvania Federalist,287 informed Hanson that the pamphlet mistakenly described the
judicial power as extending to cases between a state and its own citizens. Hanson immediately acknowledged his mistake and explained
the actions he had taken to correct it:
You are quite right with respect to my misconception of the judiciary; and
how I came to blunder so very grossly, after bestowing great attention, to
that article more particularly, I am entirely at a loss to account. I thank
you for your hints. I examined the pamphlet with the constitution immediately after I read your letter. I have already sent Goddard my apology,
which you will perhaps see in his paper. The mistake being favorable to
the antifederalists they did not think proper to expose it, altho[ugh] they
asserted generally, that I was entirely mistaken . . . .288
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See infra notes 503–15 and accompanying text.
Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 31,
1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 533 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) [hereinafter 15
DHRC].
287 Coxe played a significant role in ratification by shaping public understanding of the Constitution. See JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978).
288 Letter from Alexander Contee Hanson to Tench Coxe (Mar. 27, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra
note 286, at 553.
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On April 1, 1788, Hanson’s letter “To the People of Maryland” appeared in William Goddard’s Maryland Journal.289 In pertinent part,
Hanson’s letter states:
On a review of my late Pamphlet, I perceive that I have erred with respect
to the federal judiciary. I have stated, that the original jurisdiction of the
federal court extends to cases between a state and its own citizens. —
There is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant this construction;
and I am at a loss to account for the mistake, which is pointed out in a
private letter, I have just received from Philadelphia.
As my exposition may probably have communicated the error to others, it
was my duty to make this public acknowledgment. I am happy that the
mistake cannot be supposed willful — My purpose was to defend the constitution; but to increase the jurisdiction of the federal courts, could have
no other tendency than to increase the number of its enemies.290

Hanson’s and Coxe’s statements indicate that they did not believe that
there was any “expression in the proposed plan to warrant” the conclusion that the judicial power extended to cases between a state and its
own citizens. We know that Hanson considered federal question jurisdiction because he describes it in his original pamphlet, and he “examined the pamphlet with the constitution immediately after” receiving
Coxe’s letter. Although modern theorists assume that federal question
jurisdiction encompasses suits by citizens against their own states,
Coxe and Hanson apparently thought that only an express authorization to hear suits against states could suffice to confer such jurisdiction. Moreover, Antifederalists did not challenge Hanson’s correction
or suggest that federal question jurisdiction would support suits by individuals against states, even though it would have provided them
with additional ammunition against the proposed Constitution.
A few months later, George Mason, a leading Antifederalist, made
a similar mistake at the Virginia ratifying convention. After objecting
to the various grants of diversity jurisdiction set forth in Article III,
Mason stated: “The last clause is still more improper. To give [federal
courts] cognizance in disputes between a State and the citizens thereof,
is utterly inconsistent with reason or good policy.”291 George Nicholas
interrupted Mason to inform him “that his interpretation of this part
was not warranted by the words.”292 Mason replied that his description was based on his recollection, but acknowledged “that as his
memory had never been good, and was now much impaired from his
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
289 Aristides, To the People of Maryland, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Apr. 1, 1788 (emphasis
omitted).
290 Id. (emphasis added).
291 George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note
185, at 1401, 1403.
292 Id.
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age, he would not insist on that interpretation.”293 No one invoked
federal question jurisdiction in support of Mason’s description.
Although these incidents involve statements by only four Founders,
their remarks are consistent with the broader understanding of the nature of the Union under the proposed Constitution. Coxe, Hanson,
Mason, and Nicholas were sophisticated participants in the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution. As these incidents reveal, none of
these individuals understood the judicial power to reach suits between
states and their own citizens. Antifederalists were not shy about highlighting provisions of the Constitution to which they objected and had
every incentive to exploit Hanson’s and Mason’s mistakes if they had
represented a plausible construction of Article III.294
3. Suits Between a State and Another State or a Foreign State. —
During ratification, Antifederalists objected most strenuously to federal jurisdiction over suits against states by individuals. There was no
corresponding alarm regarding suits between two or more states, or
suits between a state and a foreign state. Article III expressly authorizes suits between (and therefore against) states. By ratifying the
Constitution, states essentially agreed to such jurisdiction as a kind of
binding arbitration. Although judgments in such cases might be hard
to enforce, establishing a means of resolving such disputes arguably
furthered — rather than threatened — national peace and harmony. If
a defendant state refused to comply with a federal judgment, then the
preexisting dispute would continue and the parties would be no worse
off. By contrast, if a defendant state complied with the judgment,
then the states’ decision to submit to such jurisdiction would have succeeded in defusing the dispute. In other words, federal jurisdiction
over suits between states (and perhaps between a state and a foreign
state) might frequently provide the very means of avoiding a war between states, whereas federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals
against states might actually provoke a civil war.
The Constitution enables states to resolve their differences voluntarily by making compacts with the consent of Congress.295 When
they are unable to do so, the Constitution provides an alternative to
war by expressly authorizing suits “between two or more States” in the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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294

Id. Mason was sixty-two years old at the time.
Of course, it is difficult to draw conclusions based solely on “the dog that did not bark.”
Compare Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“Congress’ silence in this regard can
be likened to the dog that did not bark.”), with Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592
(1980) (“In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock
Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.”).
295 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.296 The Articles of Confederation employed similar jurisdiction as a way to prevent, rather than
provoke, war between states.297 When the Constitution was adopted,
“there were existing controversies between eleven states respecting
their boundaries, which arose under their respective charters, and had
continued from the first settlement of the colonies.”298 Prominent
Founders regarded territorial disputes as likely to create hostility
among states and established the Supreme Court as an “umpire or
common judge to interpose between the contending parties.”299 In discussing this jurisdiction, Madison reiterated that the national government “in its ordinary and most essential proceedings” would operate
“on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual
capacities,” rather than “on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities.”300 Madison acknowledged that in
boundary disputes between states “the tribunal which is ultimately to
decide . . . is to be established under the general government,” but in
his view, “[s]ome such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal
to the sword and a dissolution of the compact.”301 In other words, the
Founders recognized that the underlying dispute between states —
rather than any federal judgment attempting to resolve it — posed the
greater risk of sparking hostilities.
There was no similar consensus regarding jurisdiction over suits
between a state and a foreign state.302 This jurisdiction is found in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
296 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2; see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 17 (1900) (“Controversies between [states] arising out of public relations and intercourse cannot be settled either by war
or diplomacy, though, with the consent of Congress, they may be composed by agreement.”).
297 See James Madison, Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10
DHRC, supra note 185, at 1412, 1414.
298 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838).
299 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 60–61. In the Virginia
ratifying convention, Madison observed that jurisdiction over suits between states “is not objected
to,” and was already provided for “by the existing [A]rticles of Confederation.” James Madison,
Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1414. Under
these circumstances, he thought “there c[ould] be no impropriety in referring such disputes to this
tribunal.” Id.
300 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 245.
301 Id at 246. It is unclear whether Madison contemplated federal enforcement of judgments
against states in this context. It is possible — at least in boundary disputes — that the Supreme
Court’s judgment ascertaining the border would be more or less self-executing. Once the Court
ruled, most questions regarding title and jurisdiction could readily be resolved in suits between
individuals or in suits brought by states against individuals.
302 The Constitution does not expressly authorize suits between the United States and a state.
Article III extends the judicial power “to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court first upheld its jurisdiction to adjudicate
a suit by the United States against a state in 1892. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 631
(1892). The Court regards the states’ ratification of the Constitution as consent to such suits. See
Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92,
93–94 (1999).
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same clause that confers state–foreign citizen diversity jurisdiction,
and authorizes the federal judiciary to hear suits “between a State . . .
and foreign States.” 303 Some Antifederalists objected to this jurisdiction because it could be construed to give foreign states an asymmetrical right to sue states without their consent.304 Under the law of nations, a state could not sue a foreign state without its consent, but it
was unclear whether the same restriction prevented a foreign state
from suing one of the United States. Some Federalists opined that the
jurisdiction would only apply when both parties consented to suit,305
but some Antifederalists remained unconvinced and read Article III to
allow foreign states to sue American states without their consent.306 In
the end, however, the provision generated much less controversy than
the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III.307
IV. THE ADOPTION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment was drafted to reinstate the narrow construction of Article III promised by Federalists during the ratification
debates, and to avoid the enforcement problems created by permitting
individuals to sue states in federal court. Although prominent Federalists had assured skeptics that the state-citizen diversity provisions of
Article III would not be construed to permit individuals to sue states,
the constitutional text was at best ambiguous. After the Constitution
was ratified, out-of-state citizens filed suits against six different states
in the 1790s. These suits, particularly Chisholm v. Georgia and Vassall
v. Massachusetts, triggered the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Amendment eliminated any ambiguity in the state-citizen diversity provisions by specifying that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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304

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
For example, George Mason observed that Virginia “may be sued by a foreign State. —
What reciprocity is there in it? — In a suit between Virginia and a foreign State, is the foreign
State to be bound by the decision?” George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19,
1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1403, 1406.
305 For example, Madison remarked: “I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided in these Courts, between an American State and a foreign State, without the consent of the
parties. If they consent, provision is here made.” James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1412, 1414. Similarly, Marshall stated
that the “previous consent of the parties is necessary” in suits between a state and a foreign state.
John Marshall, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185,
at 1430, 1435.
306 For example, William Grayson responded to Madison by stating: “I agree that the consent of
foreign States must be had before they become parties: But it is not so with our States. It is fixed
in the Constitution that they shall become parties.” William Grayson, Address to the Virginia
Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1444, 1448.
307 Following Chisholm, Representative Sedgwick proposed an amendment prohibiting foreign
states (as well as sister states and individuals) from suing states, but his proposal was never seriously considered. See infra notes 439–441 and accompanying text.
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States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”308
Modern commentators believe that this language — applied literally —
creates an unacceptable anomaly by prohibiting all suits by out-ofstate citizens while leaving in-state citizens free to sue using federal
question jurisdiction. Given their widely expressed understanding that
the Constitution gave the federal government neither legislative nor
coercive power over states, however, those who drafted and ratified
the Amendment simply may not have perceived any such anomaly.
The Founders apparently did not understand federal question jurisdiction to constitute an express authorization for any individual to sue
any state in federal court. In addition, the Founders may not have regarded such jurisdiction as necessary to enforce federal law. On these
assumptions, the Amendment created no anomaly and provided a
complete solution to the problems created by suits like Chisholm and
Vassall.
A. The Chisholm Decision
Three cases are central to understanding the Eleventh Amendment:
Hollingsworth v. Virginia,309 Vassall v. Massachusetts, and Chisholm v.
Georgia. Hollingsworth arose out of a dispute between the Indiana
Company and Virginia over title to 1.8 million acres of land in what
would become West Virginia.310 The Indiana Company — composed
of wealthy Pennsylvania and New Jersey merchants and land speculators — obtained a deed to the land from Indian tribes in 1768 as compensation for the earlier theft of property from merchants and traders
in the Ohio Valley.311 Virginia claimed the same land under its 1609
charter and two Indian treaties predating the 1768 grant.312 Counsel
for the Company, including Edmund Randolph, presented the Company’s case to the Virginia legislature in 1779, but Virginia refused to
compromise.313 In 1781, James Wilson — future delegate to the Constitutional Convention and Supreme Court Justice — obtained 300
shares in the Company.314 Subsequent efforts in Congress to resolve
the dispute failed.315
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 282 n.50.
Id. at 279–80.
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Notwithstanding their interest in the Indiana Company’s dispute
with Virginia, Randolph and Wilson went on to play leading roles in
drafting Article III, establishing state suability in Chisholm, and provoking the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Both men were
members of the Committee of Detail that drafted the ambiguous language of Article III at issue in Chisholm, and they may have had cases
like the Indiana Company’s dispute with Virginia in mind when they
concluded that the judicial power extended to controversies “between
a State and Citizens of another State.”316 The Company used this very
jurisdiction to sue Virginia in 1792.317 While the Virginia legislature
considered the suit, Governor Henry Lee traveled to Philadelphia to
attend the arguments in Chisholm v. Georgia.318 He described the case
as a suit “now pending before the court which involves the principle
on which rests the constitutional question whether a state can be
brought into court at the suit of individuals.”319
Shortly before Chisholm came down, Randolph filed another suit in
the Supreme Court, this time on behalf of William Vassall against
Massachusetts. Vassall had lived in Boston, but fled to London in
1775 to avoid the Revolutionary War.320 Massachusetts designated
him as a Loyalist, barred him from returning, seized his personal
property, and mortgaged his house. Following the Treaty of Peace of
1783, Vassall sought the return of his property.321 Article VI of the
treaty provided that “there shall be no future confiscations
made . . . against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part
which he or they may have taken in the present war.”322 After the
treaty took effect, Massachusetts passed a statute providing that all
real property mortgaged by the state and all personal property seized
by the state would be considered confiscated.323 Vassall regarded the
statute as “a direct contravention of the Definitive Treaty.”324 Nonetheless, his efforts to obtain compensation from the state failed. When
the Constitution was ratified, he decided to sue Massachusetts. He informed his counsel that he would argue that his property was confiscated in violation of the treaty.325 He retained Edmund Randolph to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
316
317

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 282. The Court approved subpoenas that same year to be served
on Governor Henry Lee and Attorney General James Innes. Id.
318 Id. at 283–84.
319 Letter from Henry Lee to James Wood (Feb. 7, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 326,
326.
320 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 352.
321 Id. at 353–54.
322 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, art. VI, 8 Stat. 80.
323 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 355.
324 Id. at 355–56.
325 Id. at 361.
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file suit, and the Supreme Court authorized process to be served just
one week before it decided Chisholm v. Georgia.
Chisholm was the first decision to construe Article III to permit an
individual to sue a state in federal court.326 Edmund Randolph (as an
advocate) and James Wilson (as a Justice) played key roles in bringing
about the decision. The case arose out of a 1777 contract between the
state of Georgia and Robert Farquhar, of South Carolina, for the purchase of supplies.327 Farquhar delivered the goods, but was never
paid.328 Alexander Chisholm, also of South Carolina, served as an executor of Farquhar’s estate.329 After the Constitution was ratified,
Chisholm sued Georgia in the Supreme Court.330
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, acting as Chisholm’s attorney, moved to compel Georgia to appear.331 The Georgia House of
Representatives passed a resolution on December 14, 1792, denying
that Article III of the Constitution gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the case, and declaring that Georgia would regard any
judgment as unconstitutional.332 The House also called for the adoption of an “explanatory amendment” to the Constitution to clarify that
Article III should not be construed to permit individuals to bring actions against states in federal court.333 The Court heard argument on
the motion in early February 1793. Randolph argued unopposed because Georgia declined to appear.334
Randolph relied on “the letter of the Constitution” to support his
position that the “judicial power is extended to controversies between
a State and citizens of another State.”335 This express provision, he
said, “in no respect indicat[ed] who is to be Plaintiff or who Defendant.”336 Randolph also argued that “the spirit of the Constitution”
supported his position because a suit against a state may be the only
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
326 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429–30 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.); 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 127.
327 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 127.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 127–28.
330 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 189 (1995). The case was initially filed in the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia. 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 128. Justice Iredell, sitting as a circuit judge with District Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, dismissed the suit
on the ground that the circuit court lacked statutory jurisdiction. See id. at 129–31; see also
CASTO, supra, at 188–89.
331 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 127.
332 Id. at 131–32.
333 Id. at 597.
334 Members of the Supreme Court Bar, however, did submit the resolution of the Georgia
House of Representatives to the Court. See id. at 132.
335 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
336 Id.
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way for an individual to vindicate his rights.337 He next addressed the
“master-objection that . . . the law has prescribed no execution against
a State; that none can be formed with propriety; and that, therefore, a
judgment against a State must be abortive.”338 Randolph suggested
that execution may “spring from the will of the Supreme Court” in the
exercise of its “incidental authority.”339 He acknowledged that devising a method of execution was “a difficult task,” but suggested three
possibilities.340 First, “if the judgment be for the specific thing, it may
be seized.”341 Second, if the judgment is “for damages, such property
may be taken” as would establish “jurisdiction over a sovereign
Prince” under the law of nations.342 Finally, the Court could simply
enter judgment and “leave their opinions to be enforced by the
Executive.”343
On February 18, 1793, all five Justices delivered separate opinions.
Chisholm was arguably the Supreme Court’s first major textualist decision.344 Chief Justice Jay and Justices Wilson, Blair, and Cushing
relied on the text of Article III to permit suits against a state by citizens of another state. Justice Iredell, by contrast, construed Article III
narrowly in light of the Constitution’s failure to grant Congress coercive power over states and its broader purpose to avoid a civil war.
The Chisholm opinions reveal a fundamental disagreement regarding
the existence of federal power to coerce states. Justice Wilson and
Chief Justice Jay explicitly assumed that jurisdiction to hear suits
against states implied coercive power to enforce any resulting judgments.345 Justice Iredell, by contrast, reasoned that because the Constitution conferred no federal power to coerce states, Article III should
not be construed to grant jurisdiction over suits by individuals against
states.346
Justice Blair’s opinion stressed that the text of Article III expressly
extended “to controversies between a State and citizens of another
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

Id. at 421–23 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
See id. (emphasis omitted) (referencing Bynkershoek, the Dutch international law theorist).
Id. at 427–28.
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the Judicial
Power in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1063 (2001) (“The Chisholm opinions were a clear signal that the Federalist Justices intended to follow equitable constructions and to consider fundamental law in appropriate statutory cases, including those which
could have easily been decided by simple application of the ordinary understanding of the letter of
the law.”).
345 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 464–65 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 478 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
346 Id. at 448–50 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

1880

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1817

State.”347 He saw no basis for distinguishing between cases in which a
state is the plaintiff and those in which it is the defendant. “Both cases,” he thought, “were intended.”348 Accordingly, he concluded “that if
this Court should refuse to hold jurisdiction of a case where a State is
Defendant, it would renounce part of the authority conferred, and,
consequently, part of the duty imposed on it by the Constitution.”349
With respect to inducing Georgia’s appearance, Justice Blair thought
the Court should give the state extra time “for more deliberate consideration.”350 If after such consideration the state should refuse to appear, then he would enter judgment against the state.351
Justice Wilson framed the question as whether a state “is amenable
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States,”352 but
suggested that the question “may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into
one, no less radical than this — ‘do the people of the United States
form a Nation?’”353 Justice Wilson began his constitutional analysis
by observing that, under the Articles of Confederation, the confederacy
was “totally inadequate” because its legislative authority consisted
solely of requisitions on states and because it had no executive or judicial power.354 “[T]o form a more perfect Union,” the Constitution
vested legislative, executive, and judicial power in the new government.355 The question, as Justice Wilson saw it, was whether the
people who ratified the Constitution could “bind those States, and
Georgia among the others, by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
power so vested?”356 Justice Wilson thought that “this question must
unavoidably receive an affirmative answer” because the people of the
states and “the people of Georgia, in particular, could alter, as they
pleased, their former work.”357 The only question, therefore, was:
“Has the Constitution done so?”358
Before turning to the “direct and explicit declarations” of Article
III, Justice Wilson addressed “a previous enquiry” from which the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
347
348
349
350
351
352
353

Id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.).
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted). Professor Casto recounts that “Wilson had become a shareholder of
the Indiana Company in 1781, and according to the original complaint in Hollingsworth, he was
still a shareholder.” CASTO, supra note 330, at 195. Thus, Wilson “had a direct and significant
financial interest in the Court’s jurisdiction to provide a remedy against a state.” Id.
354 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 463 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 463–64 (emphasis omitted).
358 Id. at 464 (emphasis omitted).
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question could be resolved “by fair and conclusive deductions.”359 To
determine the scope of the judicial power, he thought the Court should
first ask whether the “people intend[ed] to bind those states by the
Legislative power vested by that Constitution.”360 “The articles of
confederation,” he pointed out, “did not operate upon individual citizens; but operated only upon States.”361 Some, he observed, “seem to
think, that the present Constitution operates only on individual citizens, and not on States.”362 He thought this view was “unfounded”
because Article I, Section 10 declared that “certain laws of the States
are . . . ‘subject to the revision and controul of the Congress.’”363
Thus, “it cannot, surely, be contended that the Legislative power of the
national Government was meant to have no operation on the several
States.”364 In his view, the fact that the legislative power applies in
one instance “proves the principle in all other instances, to which the
facts will be found to apply.”365
Having found national legislative power over states, Justice Wilson
examined whether the national executive and judicial powers also
bound the states. In finding that they do, he reasoned that “[i]t would
be superfluous to make laws, unless those laws, when made, were to
be enforced.”366 In his view, “[n]othing could be more natural than to
intend that this Legislative power should be enforced by powers Executive and Judicial.”367 He also invoked the Contracts Clause in
support of state suability: “What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of
right, to no controuling judiciary power?”368 Finally, in addition to
these deductions, Justice Wilson invoked “the direct and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself.”369 He stated that by extending the
judicial power to “controversies, between a state and citizens of anoth–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
359
360
361
362
363

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Justice Wilson was referring to the provision of Article I, Section 10, which declares
that “[n]o State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10. The same provision specifies that “all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.” Id.
364 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 464 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
365 Id.
366 Id. (quoting Bracton’s maxim) (internal quotation marks omitted).
367 Id. at 465.
368 Id. On the original meaning of the Contracts Clause, see infra notes 5176–528 and accompanying text.
369 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
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er State,”370 Article III expressly described “the cause now depending
before the tribunal.”371
Justice Cushing’s opinion also stressed that the judicial power “is
expressly extended to ‘controversies between a State and citizens of
another State,’”372 and that “[t]he case, then, seems clearly to fall within the letter of the Constitution.”373 He refused to construe Article III
to limit jurisdiction to cases in which a state is the plaintiff, in part because Article III also confers jurisdiction over controversies between
two or more states. In such cases, he observed, one state must be the
defendant.374 He also rejected the argument that asserting jurisdiction
over suits by individuals against states would “reduce States to mere
corporations, and take away all sovereignty.”375 In his view, any abridgement of state sovereignty by the Constitution “was thought necessary for the greater indispensable good of the whole.”376 Justice Cushing found it unnecessary to decide whether the Court also had
jurisdiction over suits against the United States, although he suggested
that he might not find such jurisdiction.377 Finally, he foreshadowed
the Eleventh Amendment by noting that “[i]f the Constitution is found
inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a
regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”378
Chief Justice Jay upheld the Court’s jurisdiction based on three
considerations. First, Chief Justice Jay denied that Georgia was sovereign because sovereignty rested with the people, not the states.379
Second, he maintained that suability was compatible with state sovereignty. He based this conclusion on the fact that “one State in the Union may sue another State, in this Court.”380 Thus, he thought “it
plainly follows, that suability and state sovereignty are not incompatible.”381 Third, Jay concluded that “the Constitution (to which Georgia
is a party) authorises . . . an action against her” by a citizen of another
state.382 He began by noting that the Preamble to the Constitution
lists among its objects “[t]o establish justice.”383 Article III furthered
this goal, he said, by extending the judicial power “to ten descriptions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 468.
See id. at 470–72 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 474.
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of cases.”384 One of these categories consists of “controversies between
a State and citizens of another State.”385 Chief Justice Jay invoked the
“ordinary rules for construction” to reject the suggestion “that this
ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting
those in which a State may be Plaintiff.”386 He said that the “extension of power is remedial,” and ought “therefore, to be construed liberally.”387 For all of these reasons, Chief Justice Jay found that Article
III expressly authorized Chisholm’s suit against Georgia.388
Unlike the majority opinions, Justice Iredell’s dissent reflects the
concerns about federal coercion of states that animated the framing
and ratification of the Constitution. Justice Iredell began by offering a
statutory basis for rejecting jurisdiction. He concluded that the Judiciary Act did not authorize the Court to compel a state to appear before it. As support, he stressed the shift from federal power over states
under the Articles of Confederation to federal power over individuals
under the Constitution:
The powers of the general Government, either of a Legislative or Executive nature, or which particularly concerns Treaties with Foreign Powers,
do for the most part (if not wholly) affect individuals, and not States: They
require no aid from any State authority. This is the great leading distinction between the old articles of confederation, and the present constitution.389

Justice Iredell explained that the judicial power goes beyond the limited nature of federal legislative and executive power because of the
inclusion in Article III of party-based jurisdiction — jurisdiction over
disputes beyond the reach of federal legislative authority.390 Assuming
that Congress had incidental power to implement such jurisdiction,
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384
385
386
387

Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. Jay distinguished jurisdiction over suits by individuals against the United States. He
saw “an important difference between the two cases” based on enforcement considerations. Id. at
478. In suits against states, “the National Courts are supported in all their legal and Constitutional proceedings and judgments, by the arm of the Executive power of the United States; but in
cases of actions against the United States, there is no power which the Courts can call to their
aid.” Id.
388 Jay, however, did not endorse retroactive liability. He was “far from being prepared to say
that an individual may sue a State on bills of credit issued before the Constitution was established.” Id. at 479. Such bills, he said, “were issued and received on the faith of the State, and at
a time when no ideas or expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or contemplated.”
Id.
389 Id. at 435 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Omitting “minuter distinctions,” Justice Iredell suggested
that the only limitation imposed by the Constitution on states is that they “be of the Republican
form.” Id. at 448.
390 Id. at 435.
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Justice Iredell thought that Congress’s failure to do so was sufficient to
deny Chisholm’s motion.391
Because the other Justices had reached the constitutional issue,
however, Justice Iredell proceeded to discuss whether “upon a fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, the power contended
for really exists.”392 He was “strongly against any construction of [the
Constitution], which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money.”393 Echoing Hamilton’s and Madison’s arguments during the ratification debates, Justice
Iredell thought that “every word in the Constitution may have its full
effect without involving this consequence, and that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorise the deduction of so
high a power.”394 He ends with a prayer that the Court’s doctrine will
result in “none of the evils with which, I have the concern to say, it
appears to me to be pregnant.”395
In addition to his reported dissent, Justice Iredell prepared a separate document, also dated February 18, 1793, containing his observations on “this great Constitutional Question.”396 The document contains passages similar to those in his published opinion, but also
elaborates several points. Because there was no official reporter, it is
possible that Justice Iredell “may have incorporated [these observations] in his oral presentation in the Supreme Court.”397 He made two
important points for our purposes. First, he reiterated that the Constitution was designed to be enforced against individuals rather than
states:
A State doing injury to the Citizens of other States or Foreigners is to be
sure a supposable case, but it is scarcely supposable, I think, (if at all) but
by means of some act of the [state] Legislature, (for no inferior authority I
think can bind a State) . . . . If the act be consistent with the Const. of the
particular State, & the U.S., it is binding upon all, and this Court hath no
means of redressing it. If it be inconsistent with either, the act is utterly
void, and can operate as no bar to the Individual right. This, I take it, is
the very manner in which the Const. intended all Laws of the U.S. (except
in the peculiar instance of a Controversy between 2 or more States & per-
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See id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 450.
Id.
See James Iredell’s Observations on “this great Constitutional Question” (Feb. 18, 1793), in
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 186, 186.
397 Id. at 186 n.AD.
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haps one or two other instances) should operate — upon Individuals & not
States.398

Second, Justice Iredell stressed that the Constitution confers no
means of coercing states to comply with judgments in suits brought by
individuals. He observed that the Attorney General “seems very much
at a loss how our Judgment is to be enforced.”399 Justice Iredell then
suggested that, in the absence of an effective remedy, the Constitution
should not be construed to give federal courts jurisdiction to hear such
cases in the first place:
The observation “that where there is a Right, there is a Remedy”, may be
reversed — “That where no remedy can be found, there is no right.” This,
I will be bold to say, is an invariable Criterion, in respect to all compulsory suits, to try whether such a suit can in reality be maintained.400

Justice Iredell likened a judgment in a case like Chisholm to a recommendation of Congress to the states under the Articles of Confederation. In both cases, if the state thought the debt was just, the state
would pay it. “If in their opinion unjust, they would not be better disposed to pay, if left to their option, after Judgment on a compulsory
process.”401 He thought that “this is too much akin to the principle of
relying on Recommendations, which we well know were for years altogether inefficacious in the most trying circumstances, to have been
seriously contemplated in my opinion as an important Improvement
under the new System.”402 He observed that “it is essential to a Court
of J[ustice] that if it has power to pronounce a Judgment, it should
likewise have power to carry it into Execution.”403 Because he believed that the Constitution did not give Congress power to coerce
states, he concluded that the ambiguous provisions of Article III
should not be construed to authorize suits by individuals against
states.
Wilson and Jay’s embrace of federal power to coerce states to
comply with federal commands (including adverse judicial judgments)
ran counter to the Constitutional Convention’s fundamental decision
to construct a system that did not confer coercive power over states.404
During the ratification debates, Federalists repeatedly pointed to this
feature as one of the Constitution’s primary advantages over proposals
to revise the Articles of Confederation.405 Indeed, Federalists went so
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 193.
See supra section III.B, pp. 1843–53.
See supra section III.C, pp. 1853–62.
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far as to argue that a “Union of States containing such an ingredient
seemed to provide for its own destruction.”406 Similarly, in defending
the Constitution, Hamilton dismissed “as idle and visionary any
scheme which aims at regulating [the states’] movements by laws to
operate upon them in their collective capacities and to be executed by
a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities.”407 Justice Iredell
himself argued at the North Carolina ratifying convention that congressional attempts to enforce requisitions against states would lead to
a “[c]ivil war.”408 In his view, “the only natural and effective way of
enforcing laws” was against individuals, not states.409 Based on arguments like these, the Founders were convinced to abandon the Articles
and adopt a Constitution that conferred neither legislative nor coercive
power over states.
In retrospect, it is not entirely surprising that the Chisholm Court
interpreted Article III to encompass the case. Georgia did not appear
and thus Randolph’s arguments went unopposed. In addition, as Antifederalists had repeatedly warned, the text of Article III could readily
be construed as an express grant of such jurisdiction.410 Even Madison — who assured Antifederalists that Article III would not be construed to allow suits against states — admitted that this part of the
Constitution might have been “better expressed.”411 Whether the Chisholm Court properly construed Article III is an interesting and difficult
interpretive question, but is largely beside the point. The agreement
among Federalists and Antifederalists during the ratification period
against the propriety of such jurisdiction — and against coercive power over states more generally — virtually ensured that the Constitution
would be amended to overturn Chisholm.
B. The Aftermath of Chisholm
The reaction to Chisholm was swift and almost uniformly hostile.
The anger seemed to be directed as much against Federalists who had
given assurances regarding Article III during ratification as against the
Supreme Court itself. Antifederalists — who had originally urged altering Article III to guard against state suability — felt that Federalists
had played a game of “bait and switch.” The Federalists’ assurances
persuaded at least some Antifederalists to support the Constitution.
Now, a Court composed of Federalists had construed the state-citizen
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
406 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 47, 54.
407 THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 115.
408 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 146.
409 Id.
410 See supra section III.D.1, pp. 1863–70.
411 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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diversity provisions of Article III to permit individuals to sue states after all. It bears emphasizing, however, that Federalists were equally
disappointed with the Court’s decision because it contradicted their
earlier assurances and created all of the problems associated with coercive power over states that they had designed the Constitution to
avoid. Accordingly, Federalists now joined Antifederalists in supporting a constitutional amendment to restore their preferred construction.
For example, Theodore Sedgwick and Caleb Strong had both assured
Antifederalists during the Massachusetts Convention that Article III
would not be construed to permit individuals to sue states, and both
now led efforts to amend the Constitution.
Although many assume that Georgia took the lead in amending the
Constitution, Massachusetts — faced with its own suit — was actually
the first state to take action.412 Just one day after Chisholm came
down, Representative Sedgwick of Massachusetts introduced a broadly
worded constitutional amendment in the United States House of Representatives to prohibit federal courts from hearing any and all suits
against states regardless of the plaintiff’s identity.413 The next day,
Senator Strong, also of Massachusetts, introduced a more narrowly tailored amendment in the United States Senate.414 One observer who
spent time with “some of the New-England Delegates” reported that
they “were unanimously of opinion that an explanation of that part of
the Constitution should be made.”415 Congress took no action before it
adjourned two weeks later on March 2, 1793.416
With Congress out of session, activity intensified in the states. In
Massachusetts, writers reminded the public that prominent Federalists
— including Sedgwick and Strong — had assured the ratifying convention that Article III would not be construed to permit suits by individuals against states. Accordingly, they called for a constitutional
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
412 See Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1650–64 (2009).
413 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives, Gazette of the United States,
Feb. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 605, 606.
414 Resolution in the United States Senate, Feb. 20, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 607–08.
415 Letter from John Wereat to Edward Telfair, Feb. 21, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at
222–23.
416 Commentators sometimes suggest that Congress did not regard these proposals as urgent
because it failed to act before the end of the legislative session. There were both practical and
strategic reasons, however, for Congress’s inaction. First, Congress adjourned less than two
weeks later, and the new Congress did not convene until December 2, 1793. Second, some members of Congress wanted to consider a broader range of amendments limiting federal power. For
example, the members of the Virginia delegation wrote to Governor Lee on March 2, 1793, that
they deemed it improper “to commence so important a subject in so late a stage of the session.”
Letter of James Monroe and John Taylor to Henry Lee, Mar. 2, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20,
at 608. They wished to suppress “the doctrine of constructive powers . . . in its infancy,” id., and
voted for a postponement so “that the subject may be taken up more generally at the next session.” Id.
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amendment to restore that understanding. An “Anonymous Correspondent” recalled that when opponents pointed out that Article III
might “comprehend even the State itself, as a party on an action of
debt; this was denied perem[p]torily by the Federalists, as an absurdity
in terms.”417
On July 9, 1793, Governor John Hancock and Attorney General
James Sullivan were served with a subpoena commanding them to appear before the Supreme Court in Vassall v. Massachusetts. Governor
Hancock called a special session of the General Court to consider Vassall and the issue of state suability.418 Commentators applauded the
Governor’s action, but stressed that “the only way to get rid of the difficulty is by an amendment to the constitution of the United States.”419
Leading up to the special session, commentators continued to remind
the public of Federalist assurances that the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III would not be construed to permit suits against
states.420 Accordingly, Federalists and Antifederalists were united in
their opposition to state suability.421
During the special session, members of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives opposed state suability based on the original understanding of the Constitution and the impossibility of coercing states
without risking civil war. For example, William Widgery distinguished between enforcing federal judgments against individuals and
enforcing them against states. He said that if the Constitutional Convention sought to secure “the good and safety of the Nation,” then
“they never meant that execution should issue against a State.”422
Such enforcement, he warned, would “endanger the public with all the
horrors of a civil war.”423 For these reasons, Widgery was “in favor of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
417 Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1793, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 20, at 228.
418 Proclamation by John Hancock (July 9, 1973), INDEP. CHRON., July 11, 1793, reprinted in
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 387, 388–89.
419 GEN. ADVERTISER, July 24, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 391, 391.
420 Brutus recounted that apprehensions by members of the Massachusetts Convention about
the scope of Article III “were said to be groundless by the advocates of the Constitution.” Brutus,
INDEP. CHRON., July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 392, 392. A Republican
recalled that both Federalists and Antifederalists “mutually and cordially consented, that the ‘suability’ of the States was not contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution; . . . and in fact
could never bear that construction.” The Crisis, No. XIII by “A Republican,” INDEP. CHRON.,
July 25, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 395, 396. He therefore urged state legislators to oppose “a construction, in direct opposition to what ‘THE PEOPLE,’ by their Representatives, openly, and expressly declared against.” Id. at 397.
421 See Letter from Fisher Ames to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 31, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note
20, at 415 (“I conceive the entire active for[ce] of the state politics to be hostile to the [Chisholm]
decision.”).
422 William Widgery’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP.
CHRON., Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 427, 429.
423 Id. at 428.
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doing away [with] all the State Suability,” and urged adoption of an
amendment specifying “that the Judicial Court may not construe [the
Constitution] in a different manner from that which the States
intended.”424
John Davis also favored an amendment, but defended the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Article III as consistent with “the plain sense
and meaning of the words.”425 He agreed that it was inexpedient to
permit a state to be sued by an individual. He also thought that resort
to such suits was generally unnecessary because “with respect to many
controversies there was other sufficient remedy” against individuals.426
He admitted that suing a state might be the only way to remedy a
state’s breach of contract, but nonetheless opposed this course of action because:
It left the same capital, prominent defect in the Constitution, which prevailed in the old confederation, that it operated upon States and not upon
individuals. The difficulties and dangers that might ensue the attempt to
execute such a power it was unnecessary to detail. They were so many
and so great, that no one had yet suggested a mode, by which execution
could be satisfied.427

Charles Jarvis responded that even if the Constitution is “equivocal in
its meaning in this part of the judiciary article[,] . . . the inference
ought to be against the Suability of a State.”428 Accordingly, he urged
his colleagues not to “rest, till either the judiciary article is erased from
the Constitution, as it respects the point in question, or, till it is so
modified, as not to admit a similar decision in [the] future.”429
On September 27, 1793, the Massachusetts General Court advised
the Governor that “no answer WILL be made” by the state in Vassall v.
Massachusetts.430 On the same day, the General Court resolved that
the “power claimed . . . of compelling a State to be made defendant . . . at the suit of an individual . . . is . . . unnecessary and inexpedient, and in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the several States.”431 The General Court resolved:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
424
425

Id. at 430.
Account of John Davis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives (Sept. 23,
1793), INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 431, 432.
426 Id. at 433.
427 Id.
428 Charles Jarvis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives (Sept. 23, 1793),
INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 436, 437.
429 Id. at 439.
430 Reply of the Massachusetts General Court to John Hancock (Sept. 27, 1793), INDEP.
CHRON., Sept. 30, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 441.
431 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note
20, at 440.
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That the Senators from this State in the Congress of the United States be,
and they hereby are instructed, and the Representatives requested to
adopt the most speedy and effectual measures in their power, to obtain
such amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will remove
any clause or article of the said Constitution which can be construed to
imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer in any suit
by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United States.432

The legislature asked the Governor to send its resolutions to the states,
and Lieutenant Governor Samuel Adams did so on October 9, 1793.433
Four states responded by adopting their own resolutions, and by
implicitly or explicitly criticizing the Supreme Court’s construction of
Article III.434 In three more states, one House of the legislature
adopted a similar resolution, but the other House failed to act before
Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment on March 4, 1794.435
Although these resolutions differed slightly, all suggested that the Constitution be amended to remove or explain any provision that could be
construed to authorize any suit by an individual against a state in federal court.436 As Professor Pfander has explained, “[t]his outpouring of
state resolutions provides the background against which Congress
acted in adopting the Eleventh Amendment in 1794.”437
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
432
433

Id.
See Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 442, 442. On October 8, 1793, Governor Hancock died and Samuel Adams assumed his duties. Id. at 443–44.
434 See 5 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1792–1797, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 20, at 609; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT. 1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20,
at 338–39; Resolution of North Carolina General Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 615, 615; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HON. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE: DEC. 1793, at 111 (1794), reprinted
in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 618, 618.
435 See JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 20, at 610–11; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND: NOV. 1793, at 115–16 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 611;
Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, Nov. 19, 1793, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov.
23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 236. Pennsylvania and Delaware appointed special committees, but took no action before Congress acted. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE FOURTH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA 61–62 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 612–13; JOURNAL OF
THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE: JAN. 1794, at 9 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 614, 615.
436 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA: OCT. 1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 338 (calling on Virginia’s Senators and Representatives “to obtain such amendments in the constitution of the United
States, as will remove or explain any clause or article of the said constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any court of the United States”).
437 Pfander, supra note 249, at 1339.
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C. The Adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
Both Georgia and Massachusetts had refused to appear before the
Supreme Court and there was every indication that states would not
voluntarily comply with judgments against them.438 The country never had to find out, however, because opponents of the Chisholm decision acted quickly to repudiate it. As noted, within two days of the
Court’s decision, Representative Sedgwick and Senator Strong introduced proposals to amend the Constitution. Sedgwick’s proposed
amendment provided:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the
judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.439

Sedgwick’s proposal would have barred not only suits against states by
individuals, but also suits against states by other states, the United
States, and foreign nations. This sweeping proposal was “laid on the
table”440 without further action.441
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
438 The reaction to Vassall in Massachusetts suggests that it would not have been politically
possible for state officials to comply with any resulting judgment against the state. The Georgia
legislature went so far as to consider a bill declaring that anyone who attempted to enforce the
judgment in Chisholm would be “declared to be guilty of a felony, and suffer death, without the
benefit of clergy, by being hanged.” Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 9, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 236. The Eleventh
Amendment rendered these enforcement problems moot.
439 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF
THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 605–06. Sedgwick’s motion is not recorded in the House Legislative Journal or the Annals of Congress. 5
DHSC, supra note 20, at 606 n.2.
440 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF
THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 606.
441 See id. at 605, 606 n.2. Some commentators suggest that Strong’s proposal must have been
a compromise because Sedgwick’s proposal was broader. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1060.
This argument fails to appreciate the differences between the two proposals. As far as their sponsors were concerned, both proposals would have prevented individuals from suing states in federal court. Sedgwick’s proposal went further by prohibiting suits brought by “any body politic or
corporate, whether within or without the United States.” Proceedings of the United States House
of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 605–06. This proposal would have barred suits against
states not only by individuals, but also by states, foreign states, and the United States. There was
no consensus at the time for such a sweeping amendment. The state resolutions sought only to
bar suits by individuals, and even many Antifederalists accepted the need for jurisdiction over
suits between states, see, e.g., 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1409 (statement of George Mason),
and perhaps suits by foreign states against states. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the
United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765
(2004). The (over)breadth of Sedgwick’s proposal may explain why the House never acted on it
and why Sedgwick chose not to reintroduce it in the new Congress. On its face, Senator Strong’s
proposal addressed only suits against states by out-of-state citizens. Nonetheless, it effectively
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Senator Strong introduced a narrower amendment designed to
reinstate the Federalists’ preferred construction of the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III, but it also cut across all other categories of subject matter jurisdiction:
The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any Suits in
Law or Equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State.442

The Senate considered Strong’s proposal on February 25, 1793,443 but
took no other action before adjourning a few weeks later.444
It was during this period that many states (led by Massachusetts)
called on their Senators and Representatives to amend the Constitution.445 The new Congress convened on December 2, 1793. Although
Representative Sedgwick did not reintroduce his proposal, Senator
Strong — under renewed pressure from his state — introduced a
slightly modified version of his earlier proposal:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any Suit in Law or Equity, commenc[ed] or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of
any foreign State.446

The only real change from Strong’s original proposal was the insertion
of the words, “be construed to.”447 This change transformed Strong’s
proposal from an ordinary amendment (whose object was to alter the
Constitution) to an explanatory amendment (whose object was to explain the Constitution and to correct an erroneous judicial interpretation).448
The Eleventh Amendment passed overwhelmingly in Congress.
Before proceeding to a vote, the Senate rejected a proposed amendment and a substitute. Senator Gallatin sought to limit the broad
sweep of Strong’s proposal by adding an exception for cases (like Vassall) arising under treaties, and moved that the proposal read:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
barred all suits by individuals if one assumes — as the Founders did — that the state-citizen provisions were the only portions of Article III that even arguably authorized suits against states by
individuals. On this assumption, an in-state citizen would never have a basis for suing a state in
federal court. See infra section V.B, pp. 1899–1911.
442 Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 607–08.
443 Id. at 608 n.1.
444 Id.
445 See supra section IV.B, pp. 1886–91.
446 Resolution in the United States Senate (Jan. 2, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 613 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
447 The new draft also capitalized “Judicial Power,” changed “Suits” to “Suit,” and omitted
“any” prior to “one of the United States.” These changes appear to be stylistic.
448 See infra section V.A, pp. 1896–99; see also Respublica v. Cobbet, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467, 472
(1798) (observing that “the amendment . . . does not import an alteration of the Constitution, but
an authoritative declaration of its true construction”).
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The judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under
treaties, made under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States, by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state.449

The Senate rejected the Gallatin amendment,
to the diversity theory — that the Founders
suits brought by prohibited plaintiffs against
the presence or absence of a federal question.
fered a complete substitute:

confirming — contrary
wanted to preclude all
states, notwithstanding
The second motion of-

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, where the cause of action shall
have arisen before the ratification of this amendment.450

The Senate rejected this proposal and then passed the Eleventh
Amendment by a vote of 23 to 2.451
In the House of Representatives, there was a separate motion to
soften the Amendment by limiting its protection to states that consented to suits in their own courts. Specifically, the motion would
have added the following language to the Amendment: “Where such
State shall have previously made provision in their own courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect.”452 The House rejected this
proposal by a vote of 77 to 8,453 and then voted 81 to 9 to approve the
Eleventh Amendment.454
The Eleventh Amendment was transmitted to the states for ratification on March 17, 1794.455 By February 7, 1795 — less than a year
later — twelve states had ratified the Amendment.456 Although these
actions satisfied Article V,457 not all states notified Congress of ratification in a timely manner. In 1797, Congress asked the President to
“adopt some speedy and effectual means of obtaining information”
from the outstanding states as to “whether they have ratified the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
449 Proceedings of the United States Senate, Jan. 14, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20,
at 617 (emphasis added).
450 Id.
451 Id. Only Senators Gallatin and Rutherfurd voted against the proposal. Id.
452 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives, Mar. 4, 1794, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 20, at 620, 620.
453 Id.
454 Id. at 621–22.
455 Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Governors of the States, Mar. 17, 1794, in 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 625.
456 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 625–27.
457 Article V provides that an amendment “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. V.
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amendment proposed by Congress to the Constitution concerning the
suability of States.”458 After receiving proof of ratification by a sufficient number of states, President Adams informed Congress that the
Amendment had been adopted.459
While the states were in the process of ratifying the Eleventh
Amendment, the Supreme Court continued several suits against states
on its docket. It continued Vassall v. Massachusetts through 1796, but
dismissed it in 1797. Massachusetts never appeared, and the plaintiff
apparently failed to prosecute the case. After learning that Congress
had approved the Eleventh Amendment, Vassall wrote that “my Action falls of Course.”460 After the the President declared the Amendment to be “a Part of the Constitution,”461 the Court heard argument
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia to consider “[w]hether the Amendment
did, or did not, supersede all suits depending, as well as prevent the
institution of new suits, against any one of the United States, by citizens of another State.”462 Counsel in pending cases argued that the
Amendment should not apply to such cases.463 Attorney General
Charles Lee responded that the Amendment is “explanatory” and that
“[i]t was the policy of the people to cut off that branch of the judicial
power, which had been supposed to authorize suits by individuals
against states.”464 The Court agreed with Lee and unanimously held
“that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not
be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a
state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”465
V. THE TEXT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Understood in historical context, the text of the Eleventh Amendment would have made sense to those who adopted it. The Constitution was generally understood to constitute a fundamental conceptual
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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459

Resolution of the United States Congress, Mar. 2, 1797, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 628.
Message of President John Adams to the United States Congress (Jan. 8, 1798), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 637–38.
460 Letter from William Vassall to James Lloyd (Aug. 7, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at
449.
461 Message of President John Adams to the United States Congress (Jan. 8, 1798), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 20, at 637–38.
462 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 378 (1798).
463 Id.
464 Id. at 381.
465 Id. at 382. The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the dismissal of the Indiana
Company’s suit against Virginia may have contributed to Justice Wilson’s financial ruin. He speculated unsuccessfully in various real estate ventures (including the Indiana Company), and even
spent time in debtor’s prison while on the Court. He died impoverished in 1798. See generally
CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798 (1956).
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shift from the Articles of Confederation. The Articles authorized legislation solely over states, while the Constitution authorized legislation
solely over individuals. This shift avoided the need to authorize coercive force as a means of enforcing federal commands against states.
During the ratification debates, Antifederalists threatened to undermine the case for the Constitution by arguing that the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III could be construed as express authorization for individuals to sue states in federal court, and thus that the
federal government would have implied power to enforce any resulting
judgments against states. Leading Federalists denied these claims,
based in part on their narrow construction of the text in question, and
in part based on their underlying belief that the Constitution did not
authorize coercive force against states. When the Chisholm Court subsequently construed state-citizen diversity jurisdiction to permit suits
against states, Federalists and Antifederalists united to adopt an “explanatory” amendment to restore their preferred construction. This
approach had several advantages. First, it allowed Federalists to save
face by authoritatively “explaining” Article III to mean exactly what
they had said it meant. Second, it ensured that the Amendment would
apply retroactively to bar all pending suits brought under the disfavored construction of Article III. Third, understood against the background assumptions that the Constitution neither authorized citizens
to sue their own states nor empowered Congress to coerce states, the
Amendment satisfied state requests for an amendment that would remove or explain any clause of the Constitution that could be construed
to allow suit by an individual against a state in any court of the United States.
Understanding the Eleventh Amendment as an explanatory
amendment also reveals why the text was drafted as written. Contrary to the assertions of modern theorists, the text was neither underinclusive, overinclusive, nor an incoherent compromise. The text was
designed to accomplish just what the states requested — that is, to
prevent courts from construing “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States” to allow suits against states by individuals. To modern eyes,
the text appears inadequate because it says nothing about suits by instate citizens arising under federal law. The text bars any suit commenced or prosecuted against a state by citizens of another state or by
citizens or subjects of a foreign state. This approach solved the immediate problems posed by Chisholm (a suit by a citizen of another state)
and Vassall (a suit by a subject of a foreign state). By withdrawing
judicial power to hear any suit by these plaintiffs, the Amendment cut
across all categories of Article III jurisdiction. Thus, whether a suit
arises under state law, general law, or federal law, the Amendment —
by its terms — prohibits federal courts from hearing any suit brought
by a prohibited plaintiff against a state.
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To immunity and diversity theorists, the literal meaning of the text
creates an unacceptable anomaly: it prevents out-of-state plaintiffs
from suing states for any reason, while it places no restriction on the
ability of in-state citizens to sue their states using federal question jurisdiction. Those who wrote and ratified the Amendment would not
have perceived this anomaly, however, if they did not understand the
Constitution to permit citizens to sue their own states under any circumstances. In proposing and ratifying the Constitution, leading Federalists insisted that the new plan would not repeat the great and radical vice of authorizing legislation governing states (as opposed to
individuals) and would not grant the federal government coercive
power over states. Article III arguably contradicted the Federalists’
account of the Constitution because some Founders construed an ambiguity in the state-citizen diversity provisions as express authorization
for individuals to sue states in federal court. No one suggested that
federal question jurisdiction might also provide express authorization
for individuals to sue states because — unlike the state-citizen diversity provisions — the text conferring federal question jurisdiction made
no reference (ambiguous or clear) to suits against states.
In addition, given their assumptions at the time, the Founders
would not necessarily have perceived the need for suits against states
to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, laws, and treaties. All of
the constitutional restrictions on states found in Article I, Section 10
could be enforced in suits between individuals or in suits brought by
the states, and thus did not necessarily raise the enforcement problems
associated with suits against states. Likewise, if the Founders believed
that Congress lacked legislative power over states, then federal statutes
would not give rise to suits against states. Finally, treaties gave no
rights to citizens against their own states and, in any event, could be
fully enforced in suits between individuals. Based on these assumptions, the Founders likely regarded the state-citizen diversity provisions as the only portions of Article III that plausibly could be construed to permit individuals to sue states in federal court. These same
assumptions apparently informed the drafting of the Eleventh
Amendment, and may explain why the Founders perceived no anomaly in the Amendment’s treatment of in-state and out-of-state citizens.
If the Founders did not understand the Constitution to authorize instate citizens to bring federal question suits against states, then they
would not have understood the Amendment to impose a distinctive
disability on out-of-state citizens.
A. An Explanatory Amendment
As James Pfander has persuasively shown, the Eleventh Amendment was drafted as an “explanatory” amendment. Explanatory statutes were common in the eighteenth century in both England and the
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United States. Legislatures enacted such statutes “to correct or clarify
ambiguities in the law.”466 As one treatise writer explained, “[a] declaratory or expository statute is one passed with the purpose of removing
a doubt or ambiguity as to the state of the law, or to correct a construction deemed by the legislature to be erroneous.”467 In a system of
legislative supremacy, declaratory statutes were used to override prior
interpretations of the law with which the legislature disagreed.468
Such statutes typically had retroactive effect.469 In the United States,
declaratory statutes quickly fell into disuse because state and federal
constitutional reforms “recognized the sovereignty of the people, separated the powers of government, and sought to exclude the legislative
assemblies from the exercise of judicial powers.”470
Following Chisholm, the Founders assumed that a federal statute
(explanatory or otherwise) would not have sufficed to overturn the Supreme Court’s construction of the Constitution.471 Thus, within two
days of the decision, Federalists introduced constitutional amendments
in the House and Senate to prevent suits against states, but Congress
adjourned without acting on them.472 Before the next session, state
legislatures — led by Massachusetts — adopted a series of resolutions
calling on Congress to amend the Constitution.473 Virginia and North
Carolina modified Massachusetts’s proposal slightly by calling for
“such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will remove or explain any clause or article of the said constitution, which
can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any
court of the United States.”474
When Senator Strong reintroduced his amendment in the new
Congress, he added three words that by usage and tradition transformed his proposal into an explanatory amendment. His revised proposal provided that the judicial power “shall not be construed to ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
466
467

Pfander, supra note 249, at 1315.
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 370 (1896). For additional sources to the same effect, see
Pfander, supra note 249, at 1315 n.204.
468 See Pfander, supra note 249, at 1318–19.
469 Id. at 1319.
470 Id.
471 See GEN. ADVERTISER, July 24, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 391, 391
(stating that “the only way to get rid of the difficulty is by an amendment to the constitution of
the United States”).
472 See supra p. 1890.
473 See supra p. 1891–92.
474 Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates, Nov. 28, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 20, at 338–39 (emphasis added); see Resolution of North Carolina General Assembly, Jan. 11,
1794, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 615, 615.
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tend to any Suit” thereafter described.475 His proposal was now unquestionably an explanatory amendment designed to correct (what he
considered to be) the Supreme Court’s erroneous construction of
cle III. This type of amendment had several advantages. It was
roactive and would apply to all pending cases, including Chisholm v.
Georgia and — of particular importance to Senator Strong — Vassall
v. Massachusetts.476 It also satisfied the requests of several state legislatures that the Constitution be “explained.” Finally, it enabled Federalists like Strong to rebuke the Supreme Court and vindicate the position they espoused during ratification — that Article III should not be
construed to permit out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court.
Adopting an explanatory amendment to restore their preferred construction of the judicial power was not merely a political maneuver by
Federalists to save face. It also prevented the introduction of the intractable enforcement problems that they designed the Constitution to
avoid. As discussed above, one of the Federalists’ strongest arguments
was that the Constitution — unlike the Articles of Confederation —
could be enforced without authorizing the use of coercive force against
states.477 They believed that reliance on such power would lead to
civil war, and sought to avoid this danger by replacing legislation for
states (under the Articles) with legislation for individuals (under the
Constitution). This shift meant that the new Constitution could be enforced solely against individuals rather than states.478
The ambiguity that Antifederalists identified in the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III threatened to introduce the very danger that Federalists had worked so hard to avoid in drafting the new
Constitution. If controversies “between a State and citizens of another
State” included suits by individuals against states, then presumably the
federal government had implied power to enforce any resulting judgments against states. It is not surprising, therefore, that prominent
Federalists argued against a construction of Article III that would
permit this conclusion. When the Supreme Court rejected their preferred construction, Federalists led the charge to amend the Constitution. Given their fundamental opposition to coercive federal power as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
475 Resolution in the United States Senate, Jan. 2, 1794, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 613 (emphasis added).
476 The Eleventh Amendment also ensured retroactivity by referring to suits “commenced or
prosecuted” against a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Thus, even if the Supreme Court thought
that the Amendment did not apply to a suit “commenced” before its ratification, the Amendment
ensured that the Court could not construe the judicial power to permit any further “prosecution”
of that suit.
477 See supra section III.C, pp. 1853–62.
478 As Hamilton put it, the Constitution substituted “the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy” for the violent coercion of arms. THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (James Madison (with Alexander Hamilton)), supra note 12, at 138.
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a matter of institutional design, Federalists were not just keeping a
campaign promise; they were acting on their deepest beliefs about how
to construct a Constitution that would preserve the Union.
B. Reassessing the Article III Anomaly
A fundamental premise of the current debate over the Eleventh
Amendment is that the text creates an anomalous distinction between
in-state and out-of-state citizens. Applied literally, the Amendment
prevents federal courts from hearing “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”479
This prohibition means that out-of-state citizens can never sue states
in federal court, but leaves in-state citizens free to do so (assuming
they can invoke one of Article III’s other jurisdictional categories, such
as federal question jurisdiction). Both immunity and diversity theorists see this distinction as anomalous. To immunity theorists, the
Amendment is underinclusive because allowing in-state citizens to sue
states would circumvent the broad immunity the Amendment was
meant to restore.480 To diversity theorists, the Amendment is overinclusive because prohibiting out-of-state citizens from invoking federal
question jurisdiction would undermine federal supremacy and draw an
irrational distinction between in-state and out-of-state citizens.481
Immunity theorists would remedy the anomaly by recognizing state
sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the Amendment (to bar instate citizens from suing states). Conversely, diversity theorists would
remedy the anomaly by narrowing the Amendment (to permit out-ofstate citizens to bring federal question suits against states).
Because of the anomaly they perceive in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, modern commentators sometimes suggest that the
Amendment either was drafted in haste or reflected an unrecorded
compromise between Federalists and Antifederalists. Neither hypothesis rings true in historical context. Although Senator Strong introduced the Amendment just two days after Chisholm, he had almost a
year to reflect on the language while Congress was out of session.
Strong did, in fact, revise his proposal — in light of several state resolutions — to take the form of an explanatory amendment. There is
also no evidence that the Amendment was a compromise between
Federalists (who, on this account, secretly preferred no amendment or
a narrow amendment) and Antifederalists (who favored a broad
amendment). During the ratification debates, Federalists took the lead
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
479
480
481

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See supra section II.A, pp. 1826–30.
See supra section II.B, pp. 1830–32.
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in convincing the country that the Constitution — unlike the Articles
of Confederation — could be enforced solely against individuals and
thus avoided the need to introduce coercive power against states.
Chisholm construed state-citizen diversity jurisdiction to permit individuals to sue states, raising the specter of federal enforcement of
judgments against states. Given the broader historical context, it is
not surprising that Federalists led the charge to adopt an explanatory
amendment to prevent this result. Antifederalists — who objected to
the state-citizen provisions all along — supported these efforts. Neither side viewed the Eleventh Amendment as a compromise; both saw
it as vindication of their shared position that the Constitution should
not allow any suits by individuals against states in federal court or
grant the federal government coercive power to enforce any resulting
judgments against states.
1. Article III and the Eleventh Amendment in Historical Context. — To understand the Founders’ perspective on the Eleventh
Amendment and federal question jurisdiction, one must keep in mind
their fundamental goal of constructing a Constitution that did not require federal coercion of states in their collective capacities. At the
outset of the Constitutional Convention, Madison expressed the hope
“that such a system would be framed as might render [the use of force
against states] unnecessary.”482 By the end of the Convention, Madison believed that the delegates had succeeded in framing such a system. Writing to Thomas Jefferson, Madison explained that the Constitution “embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of
operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on
the individuals composing them.”483 This approach avoided the need
to grant the federal government coercive power to enforce federal law
directly against states — an approach that Madison believed “could
evidently never be reduced to practice” without producing a “civil
war.”484 If Madison was correct about the nature of the Constitution,
then there was no clear warrant in the document for concluding that
suits by individuals against states would never arise “under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority.”485
There are several indications that the Founders did not understand
federal question jurisdiction to permit suits by individuals against
states. First, the dispute between Federalists and Antifederalists over
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
482

Notes of James Madison (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 47,

54.
483 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 131, 132.
484 Id. at 131–32.
485 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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the meaning of the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III suggests that only an express provision would suffice to abrogate the
states’ pre-existing immunity from suit and contradict the Founders’
decision to withhold coercive power over states. Antifederalists argued
that the state-citizen diversity provisions contained “the most clear expressions” in favor of jurisdiction over such suits against states.486 For
example, Patrick Henry argued that “the usual meaning of the language” in question is that federal courts “shall have cognizance of controversies between a State, and citizens of another State, without discriminating between plaintiff or defendant.”487 Federalists countered
that the word “between” should be read narrowly to permit suits by,
but not against, states. In arguing for this construction, they relied on
preexisting principles of state sovereign immunity and the lack of federal power in the proposed Constitution to coerce states.488 Hamilton
went so far as to argue that the Antifederalists’ reading of the text was
“altogether forced and unwarrantable.”489 Whatever one thinks about
the contending positions, the participants in this debate were at least
arguing over express provisions that could be read to confer jurisdiction over suits against states. By contrast, the federal question provision of Article III contains no express reference to suits between, by, or
against states, and not even the most alarmist Antifederalists suggested
during ratification that it might authorize suits against states.490 Indeed, the only Founders who considered whether “the original jurisdiction of the federal court extends to cases between a state and its own
citizens” concluded that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan
to warrant this construction.”491
Second, the absence of any contemporaneous objection that the
Eleventh Amendment was too narrow suggests that the Founders considered it to be a complete solution to the problem of suits by individuals against states. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm, Senator Strong introduced an initial version of the Eleventh
Amendment in the Senate. This draft — like the final Amendment —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
486 Patrick Henry, Debate Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10
DHRC, supra note 185, at 1419, 1423.
487 Id.
488 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488.
489 Id.
490 Diversity theorists sometimes suggest that because jurisdiction in Chisholm was based on
the presence of a state as a party, Justice Iredell’s dissent might be inapplicable to federal question
suits. See Amar, supra note 76, at 1472–73; Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1058, 1063. Casto views
such suggestions as “unwarranted revisionism.” CASTO, supra note 330, at 196. He stresses Iredell’s search for “express words,” and concludes: “If the Constitution’s express reference to suits in
which states were a party was not sufficient, it is difficult to believe that the more general constitutional language extending jurisdiction to suits arising under federal law would have met Iredell’s test.” Id. at 196–97.
491 Aristides, supra note 15.
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targeted only suits by out-of-state citizens because the state-citizen diversity provisions were the only portions of Article III that anyone
suggested might abrogate state sovereign immunity. When Congress
adjourned, several state legislatures passed resolutions calling on their
Senators and Representatives to amend the Constitution to prevent
any suits by individuals against states. When Congress reconvened,
Senator Strong reintroduced essentially the same amendment, altered
only to make clear that it was an explanatory amendment.
Senator Strong had particularly compelling incentives to be responsive to the demands of his state. Like all Senators, he was appointed
by the state legislature.492 In addition, after Chisholm, Massachusetts
Antifederalists singled him out for criticism by recalling that he had
assured the state ratifying convention that Article III would not be
construed to permit individuals to sue states in federal court.493 The
Supreme Court contradicted his assurances by permitting a British
subject to sue Massachusetts and by permitting a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia. Strong had every reason to propose an amendment — as requested by Massachusetts and other states — that would
remove or explain any clause of the Constitution that could be construed to permit suits by individuals against states. Strong’s proposal
suggests that he saw the state-citizen diversity provisions as the primary sources of the problem. By cutting across all heads of jurisdiction,
however, his amendment also ensured that plaintiffs like Vassall could
not invoke any other basis for jurisdiction. Massachusetts Antifederalists apparently regarded Strong’s proposal as a complete solution to
the problems posed by cases like Chisholm and Vassall. Although extremely vocal both in criticizing Strong’s original assurances regarding
Article III and in calling for a corrective amendment, these individuals
raised no objections to the scope of Strong’s proposed amendment. It
seems unlikely that they (and their representatives in Congress) would
have remained silent if they had understood the Eleventh Amendment
to accomplish less than what the Massachusetts legislature had requested — that is, to bar any suit by an individual against a state in
federal court (including Vassall’s).494
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
492 According to Professor Casto, “the possibility that [Strong] disregarded his home state legislature’s desires seems remote.” CASTO, supra note 330, at 208. Strong was not only sent to the
Senate by the legislature, but also later served as governor of his state. Id. “Far from opposing
his home state’s political establishment, he was part and parcel of it.” Id.
493 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
494 Casto points out that Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia had all
passed resolutions calling for a broad amendment. CASTO, supra note 330, at 208. These states
had more than forty representatives and senators in Congress. Id. “If these men thought the Eleventh Amendment was inconsistent with the broad directives from their states, the inconsistency
surely would have been challenged.” Id.
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Examination of the Eleventh Amendment in historical context supports this conclusion. By its terms, the Amendment prohibits construing the “Judicial power” to extend to “any suit” brought against a
state by an out-of-state citizen. This language was sufficient to overturn Chisholm and reinstate the Founders’ preferred construction of
the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III. Senator Strong’s
proposal, however, did more. It prevented the judicial power from extending to “any suit” brought by the specified plaintiffs regardless of
which category of Article III jurisdiction they invoked. Strong was
well aware of the pending case of Vassall v. Massachusetts.495 I assume that this suit was brought under the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III because federal question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize suits against states. On the other hand, modern
readers might assume that Vassall’s suit could have rested on federal
question jurisdiction as well. Under either hypothesis, however, the
text of the Eleventh Amendment was broad enough to prohibit federal
courts from hearing Vassall’s case. Thus, it is both linguistically and
historically inaccurate to suggest — as some diversity theorists do —
that the Amendment left plaintiffs free to sue states under Article III
on any basis other than state-citizen diversity. On this theory, Vassall
and other British subjects would have been free to pursue their claims
against states using federal question jurisdiction even after the
Amendment’s adoption.496
2. The Constitution. — Apart from federal question jurisdiction’s
failure to include express authorization for suits against states, there
are several indications that the Founders would not have understood
suits against states to be necessary to enforce the Constitution. As Justice Iredell suggested in connection with Chisholm, all of the prohibi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
495
496

See supra notes 320–326 and accompanying text.
Some commentators seek to avoid this difficulty by stressing that Congress had not yet
granted lower federal courts general federal question jurisdiction, and therefore foreigners like
Vassall could not have litigated their treaty claims after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
This argument overlooks the fact that all of the suits against states in the 1790s — including Vassall — were brought under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over “all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens.” An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789). This provision did not expressly restrict jurisdiction based on the type of
claim presented. Rather, it was broad enough to authorize the Supreme Court to hear any suit
involving a state permitted by Article III. Cf. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s
Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction encompasses federal question as well as state-citizen diversity cases).
If — as diversity theorists maintain — the Eleventh Amendment merely repealed state-citizen
diversity jurisdiction and did not affect federal question jurisdiction, then suits against states arising under treaties (like Vassall’s) could have continued unimpeded under section 13. But see
CASTO, supra note 330, at 207 (maintaining that “under both the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act, the Supreme Court’s trial jurisdiction over suits by an individual against a state was absolutely limited to party-based jurisdiction”).
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tions placed on states in the original Constitution could be enforced
through ordinary litigation between individuals or suits brought by
states.497 Consider Article I, Section 10’s prohibitions against coining
money, emitting bills of credit, and making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts.498 If a state violated any of
these prohibitions, a creditor could simply refuse to accept improper
payment and sue his debtor. If the debtor raised state law as a defense, the creditor could then assert its invalidity under the Constitution. A similar analysis applies to the prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws499 (and, for that matter, to the
comparable prohibitions on the United States).500 If a state initiated
an action to enforce such a law against an individual, the Constitution
provides a complete defense. A suit against the state would have been
unnecessary to enforce these prohibitions.
Justice Wilson cited the prohibition on state imposts and duties as
support for state suability in Chisholm, noting that the clause renders
such state laws “subject to the revision and controul of the Congress.”501 But, again, enforcement of this provision need not entail
suits by individuals against states or direct federal coercion of states.
Assume that a state passed a prohibited duty and that Congress
enacted a law to revise that duty. This federal statute would qualify as
“the supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause, and thus
override contrary state law.502 If a state attempted to collect a prohibited duty, the owner of the goods could defeat the operation of the duty
by simply invoking the Constitution either as a defendant in an enforcement action or as a plaintiff suing the state officer to recover the
goods in question or appropriate damages.
These examples highlight an important point about the way in
which the Founders may have expected individuals to enforce constitutional prohibitions on government action. Absent a constitutional
provision expressly authorizing suits against the sovereign — such as
the contested state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III —
individuals would have been expected to enforce their rights only by
raising the Constitution as a defense to an enforcement action503 or by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
497 See James Iredell’s Observations on “this great Constitutional Question” (Feb. 18, 1793), in
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 186, 186; see also infra p. 1885.
498 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
499 See id.
500 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
501 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
502 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
503 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (reviewing state court denial of criminal defendant’s federal defense).
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suing government officers at common law.504 Because courts did not
yet recognize modern notions of qualified immunity, all of the Article I
prohibitions imposed on states and the United States could have been
enforced by these traditional means.505 The Bill of Rights — adopted
after the Constitution but before the Eleventh Amendment — illus–
trates the importance of this enforcement paradigm. The purpose of
the Bill of Rights was to impose restrictions on the United States in
order to safeguard individual liberty. There is no indication, however,
that anyone understood these restrictions to authorize individuals to
sue the United States directly, even though one might argue that such
suits “arise under” the Constitution for other purposes. The reason is
that — at the time — the Bill of Rights could be fully enforced by other, widely accepted means. Some of the prohibitions could be asserted
as defenses by defendants prosecuted by the United States. Others
could be enforced by individuals against federal officers in suits at
common law. If the officer asserted that his conduct was authorized
by federal law, the individual could defeat this defense if the law violated the Constitution.506
Indeed, one of the primary reasons that Antifederalists sought a
Bill of Rights was to guarantee trial by jury in civil cases.507 This
right was considered essential to the enforcement of all other restrictions on government conduct because — even assuming sovereign immunity — it ensured that government officers could be held accounta–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
504 For an illuminating discussion of state officer suits as a means of enforcing federal law, see
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824), which concludes that even if the Eleventh Amendment exempts a state from suit, “the Court may act upon the agents employed by the
State, and on the property in their hands.” Id. at 847.
505 The central role played by officer suits may surprise modern readers because today state
and federal officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982). In the eighteenth century, government officers enjoyed no such immunity and were
personally liable in tort even for good faith mistakes regarding the scope of their authority. See
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding that a federal officer following a presidential order was personally liable for seizing a vessel without statutory authority).
506 See Engdahl, supra note 283, at 14. As Professor Jerry Mashaw has explained: “Actions
were personal, against the individual; damages were a normal remedy; and office-holding carried
no special immunity from suit. Officers could plead their statutory authority as a defense, but if
the court — or jury — thought them wrong on the law or the facts, liability followed.” Jerry L.
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations 1787–1801, 115
YALE L.J. 1256, 1334 (2006); see also Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57,
67–68 (1999) (describing analogous suits against officers to enforce just compensation
requirements).
507 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 667 (1973); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12,
at 495 (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this
State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is that relative to the want of a constitutional
provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.”).
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ble by the people in actions at law, whether in state or federal court.508
Writing in late 1787, one Antifederalist argued that a right to trial by
jury was necessary because federal courts sitting without juries might
be “ready to protect the officers of government against the weak and
helpless citizen.”509 Indeed, Professor Amar has identified “strong
linkages between the Fourth and Seventh Amendments.”510 In particular, the Seventh Amendment facilitated recoveries against federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Both in England and America, the
traditional remedy for such abuse was to sue the offending officer for
damages.511 Antifederalists feared that without civil juries, “every arbitrary act of the general government, and every oppression of [its officers] for the collection of taxes, duties, imposts, excise, and other
purposes, must be submitted to by the individual.”512 The right to trial by jury in civil suits against government officers gave citizens a significant means of checking government misconduct.513 As Amar has
recounted, “[i]n America, both before and after the Revolution, the civil trespass action tried to a jury flourished as the obvious remedy
against haughty customs officers, tax collectors, constables, marshals,
and the like.”514
This background suggests that the Founders may have assumed
that common law actions against officers would be the primary means
of enforcing the prohibitions against the United States set forth in both
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. No one suggested that Article
III granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits by individuals
against the United States arising under the Constitution or the Bill of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
508 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 775–78
(1994). Presumably, common law trespass actions against federal officers would be brought in
state court, with a right to trial by jury under state law. If Congress authorized removal of such
actions to federal court, the Seventh Amendment ensured that the plaintiff would retain the right
to trial by jury.
509 Essay of a Democratic Federalist, PENN. HERALD, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 58, 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
510 Amar, supra note 508, at 775.
511 See id. at 774–76, 786; Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (“If the subject was the victim of illegal official action, in
many cases he could sue the King’s officers for damages.”); see also BRADFORD P. WILSON,
ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 9–33 (1986).
512 Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, 1788, in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 509, at 27, 71 (emphasis omitted); see also Essays by Hampden, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 509, at 198, 200 (“Without [a jury], in civil actions, no relief can be
had against the High Officers of State, for abuse of private citizens . . . .”).
513 See Engdahl, supra note 283, at 19.
514 Amar, supra note 508, at 786; cf. Jaffe, supra note 511, at 14 (“Earlier actions against [English] officers were typically in trespass for taking of goods, interference with land, or laying
hands on the person.”).
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Rights. The reason was that federal question jurisdiction did not constitute an express waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.
Such jurisdiction, however, did ensure that federal courts could enforce
the Constitution in common law actions against government officers
who claimed that their (unconstitutional) conduct was authorized by
law. If the Founders did not understand federal question jurisdiction
to authorize suits against the United States, it would be surprising if
they understood it to authorize suits against states. Such jurisdiction
played a crucial role in ensuring the supremacy of federal law in suits
against state and federal officials, but it was not explicit enough either
to override preexisting notions of sovereign immunity or to confer the
kind of coercive power over states that the Founders disavowed in
drafting and ratifying the Constitution.515
There was one constitutional prohibition that at least arguably required enforcement against states. The Contracts Clause provides that
no state shall pass any “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”516
Justice Wilson invoked this clause in Chisholm517 to support state suability. He asked: “What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its
own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no
controuling judiciary power?”518 When adopted, however, the clause
was generally understood to apply only to private contracts between
individuals, not to a state’s own contracts.519 The clause was modeled
on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that “no law
ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in
any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts.”520 At
the Convention, Rufus King “moved to add, in the words used in the
Ordinance of Congs establishing new States, a prohibition on the
States to interfere in private contracts.”521 The delegates initially
thought that the Ex Post Facto Clause would reach laws impairing the
obligation of contracts,522 but later concluded that “the terms ‘ex post
facto’ related to criminal cases only.”523 Accordingly, they added a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
515
516
517
518
519

Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
See supra p. 1881.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.).
See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3–16 (1938).
520 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the
River Ohio, as adapted by An Act To Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a (1789); see WRIGHT, supra note 519, at 7–8.
521 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 439.
522 Id. at 440.
523 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 447, 448–49.
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prohibition on “laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts.”524
During the ratification debates, only two Antifederalists (neither of
whom attended the Constitutional Convention) suggested that the
Contracts Clause might apply to public as well as private contracts,525
and they were quickly corrected by delegates who had attended the
Convention.526 Professor Benjamin Wright, the leading scholar on the
clause, concludes that a “careful search has failed to unearth any other
statements even suggesting that the contract clause was intended to
apply to other than private contracts.”527 Modern scholars — including those skeptical of sovereign immunity — acknowledge that the
Contracts Clause was not clearly understood originally to apply to
public contracts.528 If the Founders understood the clause to apply only to private contracts, then they would not have expected the clause to
generate suits against states or necessitate coercive enforcement.
3. The Laws of the United States. — There is a relatively straightforward reason why the Founders may not have expected suits against
states to arise under the laws of the United States. As discussed, the
Founders did not understand the Constitution to grant Congress legislative power over states. This was the “great and radical vice” in the
existing Confederation,529 and the Founders were determined not to
repeat this mistake. Accordingly, leading Federalists emphasized that
the Constitution granted Congress the power to tax and regulate individuals instead of states, and thus did not grant the power to coerce
states. This meant that neither the executive branch nor the judicial
branch would be in the position of having to enforce federal legislative
commands against states. Instead, these branches would simply en–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
524 Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138,
at 590, 597. There was no further discussion of the provision at the Convention.
525 See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at
1356 (statement of Patrick Henry) (“The expression includes public contracts, as well as private
contracts between individuals.”); Debates of the North Carolina Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 190 (statement of James Galloway) (suggesting that the
Contracts Clause “may compel us to make good the nominal value of [our public] securities”).
526 See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at
1360 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (explaining that the Contracts Clause was inserted because of the “frequent interferences of the State Legislatures with private contracts,” and that the
federal judiciary is “to inforce the performance of private contracts” under the Clause); Debates of
the North Carolina Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 191
(statement of William Davie) (“The clause refers merely to contracts between individuals.”).
527 WRIGHT, supra note 519, at 16.
528 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1055 n.97 (“The contracts clause may have been intended
originally to protect only contracts between private parties from impairment by acts of the
states.”); Pfander, supra note 249, at 1344 (stating that “it was far from clear that the Contracts
Clause was understood to apply to a state legislature’s impairment of its own contracts with
individuals”).
529 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 108.
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force legislative commands against individuals.
This approach
avoided the dangerous expedient of military coercion against states by
substituting “the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy” in place
of “violence.”530 It also meant that suits against states would not arise
under “the Laws of the United States.”
Modern readers may be puzzled by the Founders’ evident understanding of the Constitution because today’s assumptions about congressional power over states are different. Changed circumstances
have contributed to this dichotomy. The original understanding was
informed by a desire to avoid a civil war. Our modern understanding,
by contrast, developed in the aftermath of the Civil War. The Civil
War Amendments expressly prohibit certain state practices — including denials of liberty, due process, equal protection, and voting rights
— and give Congress express power to enforce these prohibitions.531
These constitutional provisions arose out of the Civil War, and their
proponents were more than willing to enforce them against states
through suits and — if necessary — military force. Examining the
original Constitution from the Founders’ perspective, however, reveals
why those who drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amendment would
not have understood federal question jurisdiction to permit citizens of
any state to sue a state to enforce a federal command at the time the
Amendment was adopted.
4. Treaties. — It appears that the Founders did not expect suits by
individuals against states to arise under treaties both because federal
question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize such suits, and because of the nature of treaties in the eighteenth century. The most important treaty at the time of the Founding was the 1783 Treaty of
Peace with Great Britain. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
states were notorious for interfering with the operation of the Treaty.532 Article IV of the Treaty provided that “creditors on either side,
shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value
in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”533
Many states enacted and enforced laws that made it difficult, if not
impossible, for British creditors to recover their preexisting debts in
state court. For example, Virginia enacted a statute during the war
discharging British debts if the debtor paid the state instead of the
British creditors.534 Judge Gibbons has suggested that the Founders
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
530
531
532

THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 138.
See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1440–44; Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III
and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 852–53 (2007).
533 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
534 See Gibbons, supra note 63, at 1903.
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expected British creditors to bring suits arising under the Treaty directly against states,535 but it is more likely that they expected creditors to sue their individual debtors and rely on the Treaty to defeat any
state law defenses.536
Ware v. Hylton537 demonstrates how the Treaty could be enforced
without resort to suits against states. British creditors sued Virginia
debtors and the latter argued that their debts had been discharged under the Virginia statute. The creditors invoked the Treaty and the Supreme Court held that it preempted contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause.538 Ware shows that treaties could be fully enforced in
suits between individuals; there was no need for an individual to sue
the state. Justice Paterson made this point explicitly in Ware: “Did this
clause make Virginia liable to a prosecution for the debt? Is Virginia
now suable by such British creditor? No; he would in such case be totally remediless, unless the nation of which he is a subject, would interpose in his behalf.”539
Article VI of the Treaty of Peace could also be enforced through
suits between individuals. The Treaty drew an important distinction.
With respect to property confiscated before the Treaty, Article V merely “recommend[ed] it to the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have
been confiscated.”540 By contrast, with respect to property not yet confiscated, Article VI declared that “there shall be no future confiscations
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
535
536

See id. at 1902.
To this end, the first Congress gave federal courts diversity jurisdiction to hear controversies
between foreign citizens and state citizens, but imposed a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
(2006)). This required most British creditors to pursue their claims in state court, where they were
less likely to prevail. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law
of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 (2009). They could raise their rights under the Treaty of
Peace, but their only opportunity for federal enforcement of these rights was an appeal to the Supreme Court. See § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86. British dissatisfaction with U.S. compliance with the
Treaty led to the adoption of the Jay Treaty of 1794. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. The Jay Treaty “was
designed to discharge the unfulfilled promises of the 1783 Treaty of Peace” by creating “a mixed
commission to arbitrate claims by British subjects.” Monaghan, supra note 532, at 852–53. Professor Lee has suggested that the Founders hoped the Supreme Court would adjudicate disputes
between foreign states and states in its original jurisdiction, see Lee, supra note 441, at 1868–70,
but specifically rejected the notion that the Founders sought to facilitate suits by foreign citizens
against states. See Lee, supra note 90, at 1028.
537 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
538 Id. at 235–37.
539 Id. at 250 (Paterson, J., concurring). Justice Paterson is referring to a sovereign’s decision to
espouse a claim by one of its citizens, which “rendered it a public claim on the international plane,
and the [claimant’s] sovereign could lawfully wage war to vindicate the espoused claim.” Lee,
supra note 441, at 1856.
540 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. V, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82.
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made.”541 Thus, if a state confiscated real property owned by British
subjects after the Treaty was adopted, the original owner could bring
an action against the individuals in possession to recover the property
in question. If the defendants invoked state law to establish their right
of possession, the claimant could simply invoke the Treaty as the supreme law of the land to override such law. Although perhaps less
convenient than suing the state directly, this course ordinarily would
suffice to uphold the supremacy of the rights conferred by the treaty.
More importantly, this course avoided all of the dangers — including
the potential for civil war — that might arise from enforcement of federal judgments against states.
Understood in its historical context, the Eleventh Amendment
would not have created the anomaly that modern commentators perceive with respect to cases arising under treaties. Although the
Amendment is limited to denying judicial power over suits against
states by out-of-state and foreign citizens, the Founders did not expect
that citizens would ever have occasion to sue their own states in cases
arising under treaties. The reason is simple. In the eighteenth century,
treaties were exclusively concerned with how nations treated each other or how they (or their citizens) treated foreign citizens.542 The use of
treaties to govern how nations treat their own citizens did not begin
until well into the twentieth century.543 The Treaty of Peace exemplifies the eighteenth century paradigm. It expressly restricted the states’
ability to confiscate the property of British citizens, but it placed no
restrictions on the states’ ability to confiscate the property of their own
citizens. Thus, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, barring
out-of-state citizens from bringing any suits against states would have
created no anomaly. As far as the Founders were concerned, after the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, there was no basis for either instate or out-of-state citizens to sue states on the basis of a treaty.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
Taken in its historical context, the Eleventh Amendment did not
create absurd or anomalous distinctions between in-state and out-ofstate citizens. Because the Founders believed that the Constitution
neither imposed affirmative obligations on states nor authorized Congress to exercise legislative power over states, they would not have understood federal question jurisdiction to constitute express authoriza–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
541
542

Id. art. VI, 8 Stat. at 83.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111, introductory n. (1987); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Book
II, Ch. XII (John Berry & John Rogers trans., 1787) (1758).
543 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1177 (1990).

1912

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1817

tion for federal courts to hear suits against states by their own citizens.
Thus, prohibiting federal courts from hearing any suit against a state
by an out-of-state citizen was a coherent and efficient means of both
restoring the Founders’ preferred construction of Article III and avoiding the enforcement problems posed by judgments against states in favor of individuals. Keeping the Founders’ assumptions in mind, they
would not have understood the Constitution to provide any basis for
individuals to sue states in federal court after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
Because the Amendment made sense when
adopted, the absurdity doctrine provides no warrant for departing
from the text as written. Adhering to the text and dismissing any suit
that falls within its terms would avoid the problem of purposive “freestanding federalism” divorced from the constitutional text.544 If the
Supreme Court wishes to continue to shield states from suits brought
by their own citizens, then it must rest its decisions on the nature of
the Union rather than the Eleventh Amendment.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides an incomplete basis
for much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding state sovereign immunity. For example, Hans v. Louisiana545 and its progeny
suggest that the purpose of the Amendment was to prevent both instate and out-of-state citizens from suing states in federal court for
breach of contract, but the text is much narrower. It is true that the
Founders assumed that suits like Hans would not arise because the
original understanding of the Contracts Clause appears to have been
limited to impairment of private contracts.546 In 1810, however, the
Supreme Court began interpreting the clause to apply to public as well
as private contracts.547 These cases, along with Congress’s enactment
of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875,548 paved the way for
cases like Hans that arose when states began defaulting on their public
obligations.
It is important to recognize that expanded interpretations of the
Contracts Clause and federal question jurisdiction — rather than the
Eleventh Amendment — created the anomaly that the Hans Court
sought to avoid. In-state citizens could now sue their states for violating the Contracts Clause, while out-of-state citizens were barred by the
terms of the Amendment from bringing identical suits against the same
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
544 See generally John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009).
545 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
546 See supra notes 519–528 and accompanying text.
547 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810); see also Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 513, 518 (1819) (holding that the Contracts Clause prohibits a state
from altering a private institution’s state-issued charter).
548 Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
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states. The Court considered the supposition that the framers and ratifiers of the Amendment had left citizens free to sue their own states
to be “almost an absurdity on its face.”549 To prevent this anomaly, the
Court recognized state sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the
Amendment, but failed to ground such immunity firmly in the constitutional text. There were at least two alternative rationales available.
First, the Court could have returned to the original understanding of
the Contracts Clause rather than expanding immunity beyond the
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.550 Had it chosen this course, the
Hans Court could have dismissed the case not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but for failure to state a claim under federal law.551
Second, the Court could have dismissed the case on the ground that
Article III's grant of federal question jurisdiction, as originally understood, did not provide an express authorization for federal courts to
entertain suits by individuals against states.
The Supreme Court has also recognized other kinds of immunity
outside the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,552 for example, the Court held that a state is immune from suit brought by a foreign state. The authorization for jurisdiction in such cases is found in the same portion of Article III as
the state-foreign citizen diversity clause. The entire provision states
that the judicial power shall extend to controversies “between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”553
Because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only those constructions
of Article III that would permit any suit against a state by “Citizens or
Subjects” of a foreign state, one might conclude that the Amendment
contains a negative implication that Article III permits foreign states
to sue states in federal court.554 Moreover, the purpose of the
Amendment — to avoid risking a civil war by enforcing federal commands against states — is arguably inapplicable when a foreign state
sues a state. In the latter case, providing a federal forum to adjudicate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
549
550

Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
Cf. Massey, supra note 7, at 135 (suggesting that the Hans Court expanded Eleventh
Amendment immunity in order to avoid “the unpalatable choice of abandoning accepted Contract
Clause doctrine”).
551 For similar reasons, the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity dissenters should abandon the
diversity theory and adhere to the text of the Eleventh Amendment. These Justices favor narrowing the text by allowing at least some suits prohibited by the terms of the Amendment. This approach not only contradicts the text, but also undermines one of the central purposes of the
Amendment: to deny federal jurisdiction in cases like Vassall v. Massachusetts. See supra notes
495–496 and accompanying text.
552 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
553 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
554 See Manning, supra note 9, at 1740–49.
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the dispute might actually help to prevent a war with a foreign
state.555
The Supreme Court has not only recognized immunity outside the
Eleventh Amendment, but also disregarded key portions of the
Amendment by permitting some suits barred by its terms. For example, the Court has long held that the Amendment does not prohibit
suits against states if the state waives its immunity.556 The text of the
Amendment, however, says nothing about immunity. Rather, it prohibits federal courts from construing the judicial power to extend to any
suit against a state by a prohibited plaintiff.557 Because the Amendment is written as a limitation on “the judicial power,” it deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction — a defect that cannot ordinarily be waived by the parties.558
Similarly, because the Eleventh Amendment limits the scope of the
judicial power, Congress cannot authorize citizens of another state or
of a foreign state to sue states in federal court. To do so would exceed
the constitutionally prescribed limits of the judiciary’s subject matter
jurisdiction. By contrast, assuming that federal question jurisdiction
permits federal courts to hear suits by individuals against states, Congress may create federal causes of action against states by their own
citizens so long as Congress acts pursuant to a constitutional power
that permits regulation of states. Accordingly, the constitutionality of
such legislation would turn not on the Eleventh Amendment, but on
the scope of Congress’s powers under both the original Constitution
and the Civil War Amendments. Although the Founders understood
the original Constitution not to grant Congress power to enact legislation for states in their political capacity or to enforce federal commands against states,559 the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s
Article I, Section 8 powers differently in the modern era.560
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida561 illustrates these points. The
case did not implicate the terms of the Eleventh Amendment because
Florida was sued by its own citizens pursuant to a federal statute.
The case turned, therefore, on the scope of congressional power.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
555
556

See Lee, supra note 441, at 1809.
See Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883).
557 See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 310 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the “literal wording” of the Amendment as “a flat prohibition against the federal judiciary’s entertainment of suits against even a
consenting State brought by citizens of another State or by aliens”); see also Nelson, supra note 91,
at 1614 (explaining that “the Amendment seems to deprive the federal courts of authority to adjudicate the designated categories of suits”).
558 See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
559 See supra Part III, pp. 1838–75.
560 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
561 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Nonetheless, the Court concluded that “[e]ven when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”562 The Court’s
reasoning is difficult to square with the Amendment’s terms. The
Amendment bars only suits against states by out-of-state citizens. If
(as the Court assumed) Congress had constitutional power to authorize
the suit in question, then the Amendment was largely beside the point.
Assuming that federal question jurisdiction encompasses suits against
states, the Court should have decided the case by reference to whether
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress legislative power over states. As
discussed, the Founders understood the original Constitution not to
empower Congress either to exercise legislative power over states or to
coerce states.
Modern assumptions about the scope of federal power are very different. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,563 the Supreme Court held that Congress may subject
states, as employers, to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Garcia
Court read Article I, Section 8 to authorize Congress to regulate states
to the same extent that it authorizes Congress to regulate individuals.
The Court refused to recognize any exemption for “States as States.”564
As others have observed, the Court’s subsequent decisions in Seminole
Tribe and Alden v. Maine565 make it difficult to enforce such federal
commands against states.566 These cases held that Congress cannot
authorize citizens to sue their own states in either federal or state court
as a means of enforcing Congress’s regulation of states.567
These two lines of cases are difficult to reconcile.568 The important
point for present purposes, however, is that the Eleventh Amendment
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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563
564
565
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Id. at 72.
469 U.S. 528.
Id. at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 11, at 1707 (suggesting that the immunity theory of the Eleventh Amendment “would eliminate (or at least place significant obstacles in the way of) perhaps
the most effective, and certainly the most straightforward, method of enforcing” the obligations
that Congress imposes on states vis-à-vis individuals). But see Monaghan, supra note 47, at 103
(pointing out that in “suits for prospective relief, states are still accountable in federal court —
through their officers — for the violation of federal law”).
567 Professor Ernest Young has gone so far as to suggest that the Court’s recent sovereign immunity decisions may be “‘payback’ for the Garcia decision.” Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5.
568 See Nelson, supra note 91, at 1652 (suggesting that “Congress’s power to command states to
answer private suits seeking the minimum wage should stand or fall with Congress’s power to
command states to pay the minimum wage in the first place”). But see Vázquez, supra note 11, at
1781–82 (suggesting that Congress may impose obligations on states, but those obligations may be
enforced only in suits against individual state officers). The Founders’ understanding of the nature of the Union may be relevant not only to Garcia, but also to the Court’s subsequent anti-

1916

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1817

has little to say about the issue. How one decides these cases depends
on one’s conception of the scope of Congress’s Article I, Section 8
powers, which in turn depends on one’s approach to constitutional interpretation.569 As discussed, the Founders’ original intent seems to
have been that the Constitution withholds power from Congress both
to
leg
islate for states (as opposed to individuals) and to coerce state compliance with federal commands.570 By contrast, the original public
meaning of the text may or may not reflect this understanding because
the Constitution does not expressly grant or deny congressional power
over states.571 A dynamic approach to interpretation might rely on
changed circumstances to conclude that — notwithstanding the original understanding — the Constitution should now be construed to give
Congress power to regulate both individuals and states.572 Finally, regardless of how one resolves these complex interpretive questions,
stare decisis arguably counsels in favor of maintaining the states’ longrecognized immunities over more recent decisions that endorse broad
congressional power over states. 573 Although these questions are
beyond the scope of this article, the important point here is that their
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
commandeering decisions. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress
may not require state executive officers to execute federal law); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not require state legislatures to enact specific
legislation).
569 Arguably, the text of the Eleventh Amendment — understood in historical context — tells
us something about the limited nature of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers under the original
Constitution. Cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (explaining that “the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications of a later statute”).
570 See supra Part III, pp. 1838–75. For general discussions of original intent, see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 967 (2004); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
571 See Manning, supra note 544, at 2032 (arguing that the Founders who disfavored federal
commandeering of states “took no affirmative steps to reduce that purpose to a textual proscription”). For general discussions of original meaning, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J.
1113 (2003); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47 (2006); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751
(2009).
572 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165 (2008) (arguing that the original meaning of enactments should matter more during their enactors’ lifetimes
and diminish over time).
573 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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resolution turns on the scope of congressional power rather than on the
precise meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court has drawn at least one distinction, however,
that appears to make sense in historical context. The Court has held
that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments even though
it cannot do so pursuant to Article I, Section 8.574 The original Constitution was framed to avoid a civil war by denying Congress legislative
power over states. The Civil War Amendments, by contrast, were
framed in the aftermath of the Civil War to prohibit unacceptable
state action and to empower Congress to enforce such prohibitions.
This difference suggests — as the Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer575
— that congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity is constitutional pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if
such abrogation would be unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, Section 8.576 In other words, federal statutes authorizing suits against
states under section 5 rest on express constitutional “authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within
the Fourteenth Amendment.”577
Congressional enforcement of the Civil War Amendments is unlikely to contradict the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments primarily restrict the
way states treat their own citizens. Thus, suits against states to enforce such restrictions will not ordinarily implicate the Eleventh
Amendment’s specific withdrawal of federal judicial power to hear
suits against states by citizens of other states. In sum, the distinct historical contexts surrounding the adoption of the original Constitution
and the Civil War Amendments provide an added justification for the
Supreme Court’s distinctive treatment of congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under Article I, Section 8 and under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modern theorists tend to discount the precise terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. They regard the Amendment as either unacceptably underinclusive or unacceptably overinclusive because it appears to bar
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
574 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)).
575 427 U.S. 445.
576 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65–66 (explaining that “the Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment”).
577 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880)).
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all suits against states by out-of-state citizens while leaving in-state citizens free to sue under federal question jurisdiction. Textualists agree
that the Amendment is less than coherent, but assume that this was
the result of an unrecorded compromise necessary to secure its adoption. This Article maintains that the terms of the Amendment made
sense in historical context. The key to understanding the Amendment
is to read it in light of the Founders’ understanding of the nature of
the Union. In their view, the Constitution did not authorize Congress
to exercise legislative power over states or to use coercive force against
states to enforce federal commands. For this reason, only an express
constitutional provision would suffice to authorize suits against states
in federal court. The Founders publicly debated whether the statecitizen diversity provisions of Article III constituted such authorization. By contrast, the Founders do not appear to have expected federal question jurisdiction to generate any suits by any citizens against
any states. Thus, amending the Constitution to bar “any suit” against
a state by out-of-state citizens provided a complete solution to the
problem of state suability presented by cases like Chisholm v. Georgia
and Vassall v. Massachusetts. This course created no anomaly between the ability of in-state and out-of-state citizens to sue states in
federal court because — from the Founders’ perspective — neither
group of citizens had an express basis for suing a state in federal court
after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Because the Amendment made sense in historical context, the anomaly that modern theorists perceive provides an inadequate basis for departing from its precise text.

